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When Adam. delved and Eve span, 
Who was then the gentleman?* 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
It is old learning that the Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted so 
that its most important sections have little resemblance to the original plan of 
its sponsors. Since the equal protection clause is in a setting which includes 
the many other provisions of the Amendment, we recount their fate.2 
* Sullivan, The Antecedents of the Declaration of bulePe11dence, 1 ANN. REP. AM..· 
HxsT. Ass'N. 65, 8Q ,(1902). The author credits this jingle, originating about the time of 
Wat Tyler's rebellion, as the first popularization of the idea of the equality of man and 
attributes its popularity to Wycliffe. The same conception was of course current among 
intellectuals many centuries earlier. See the valuable new work of Wormuth, The Ori-
gins of Modem Constitutionalism, c. 2 (1949). 
1. A part of the work on this Article was done by the Authors in connection with a 
matter in litigation in which they participated as amici curiae, without compensation. 
Bibliographical note: The leading published work ori the historical interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment is Flack, THE ADoPTION OF THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(1908), and the outstanding unpublished work with which we are acquainted is ]AMES, 
THE FRAMING OF THE FouRTEENTH AMENDMENT (1939), an un_l>ublished doctor's thesis 
at the University of Illinois. An outstanding article is Graham, The "Conspiracy Theory" 
of the Fo11rteenth Ame11dment, 47 YALE L. ]. 371, 48 YALE L.]. 171 (1938). In addition 
to aid from these sources, the authors have considered all available works on the recon-
struction period, particularly the biographies and memoirs of persons prominent at the 
time and the correspondence of Stevens, Fessenden, Trumbull, Morrill, Wilson, and Sum-
ner at the Library of Congress for important months in the year 1866. Also examined 
were the various volumes of McPHERSON's SCRAPBOOKS of newspaper clippings on the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the election of 1866; the legis-
lative journals of the various states for the records of ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; and the leading historical reviews. The primary source explored has been 
all discovered debates in Congress as well as committee reports and hearings relating to 
civil rights from 1860 to 1875. Substantially nothing of significance was found in the 
personal papers of prominent individuals although a more extended research into them 
might have richer results. The Sunmer Manuscripts at Harvard were not studied as they 
were covered in the work of James, from which some references have been taken. The 
curator of manuscripts at the Burton Historical Collection of the Detroit Public Library 
informed us that there is nothing significant to this topic in their collection of the Howard 
Manuscripts for the year 1866. Newspaper files outside the McPherson collection have 
not been extensively studied. 
2. The language of the two Sections of the 14th Amendment to which most reference 
will be made in this paper is as follows : 
"Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
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1. It soon became popularly believed that the primary purpose of the 
entire Amendment was to make the Negroes citizens. As Flack's researches 
have shown, however, the first sentence of the Amendment which has this 
effect was added, almost as an afterthought, after the Amendment had al-
ready left the Joint Committee on Reconstruction and had passed the House.8 
2. Privileges and immunities to be protected from state interference were 
intended by the two major sponsors of the section to include at least the first 
eight Amendments of the Constitution, and perhaps a good deal more.4 The 
extreme vagueness of this phrase, however, permitted its quick reduction by 
interpretation to a virtual nullity.6 It has been of no consequence since. 
3. The due process clause was almost ignored in the course of adoption.o 
This clause has, of course, become the most important in the Amendment, 
and much of what the sponsors of the Amendment intended to be covered by 
the privileges and immunities clause has been absorbed by interpretation into 
due process. 
4. As Graham has shown, the term "person" was never explicitly said 
to include corporations. In view of the very limited meaning given due 
process, there was little reason why anyone would have wanted to include 
corporations as persons.7 If the sponsors of the Amendment had any notion 
of including corporations within the protection of the section, it was probably 
as "citizens" under the privileges and immunities clause.s 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws .••• 
"Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article." 
3. FLACK, op. cit. SltPra note 1, Passim. The admission of a N cgro to the bar of the 
Supreme Court on motion by Senator Sumner was widely regarded as a decision by the 
Court that Negroes were citizens and that the Drcd Scott decision was overruled. For 
an account of that episode, including Sumner's correspondence with Chief Justice Chase 
through which the opirJon of the Court was informally taken before the motion was made, 
sec 9 WoRKs OF CHARLES SuMNER 229-32 (1875). 
4. Mr. Justice Blacl~ dissenting in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68, 92 (1947) 
(appendix) ; FLACK, (lp. cit. supra note 1, Passim. Not only did the legislative leaders 
make the point categorically, but also it had front page press display. N. Y. Times, May 
24, 1866, p. 1. Some evidence that this interpretation was not generally comprehended is 
-offered in Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 
2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949). 
5. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U.S. 1873). Boutwell, a member of the 
Joint Committee on Reconstruction, observed in his memoirs: "The part relating to 'privi-
leges and immunities' came from Mr. Bingham of Ohio. Its euphony and indefiniteness of 
meaning were a charm to him." 2 BOUTWELL, REMINISCENCES OF SIXTY YEARS 41 
(1902). 
6. No reference to due process was found which gives it more than a procedural con-
notation. 
7. Graham, supra note l, passim; Boudin, Tmth & Fictio11 About the Fourteenth 
Ammdnzmt, 16 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 19 (1938). 
8. In 1871 Bingham, principal draftsman of Section One of the Amendment, urged a 
bill to declare corporations citizens for privileges and immuities purposes. This accords 
with the position taken by Webster in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 549 (U.S. 
1839), discussed in SwisHER, RoGER B. TANEY c. 18 (1935). For a brief account of the 
Bingham bill, see McLaughlin, The Court, the Corporation, and ConkliiJg, 46 AM. HIST. 
REv. 45, 51 (1940). 
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Against this background this Article will explore the original under~ 
standing of the equal protection clause. 
Before the e..xploration, warnings must be given. The generalities of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, as reported fro~ Committee, were voted ·upon by 
218 Congressmen, were discussed in hundreds of speeches and countless 
editorials in the election of 1866, and were· thereafter voted upon by sonie 
thousands of state legislators. Even if the times had been calm and condi-
tions static, the general phrases of the Amendment could not have meant 
even approximately the same thing to all who voted upon them; and in fact; 
interpretations did diverge widely. 
Moreover, the times were not static. In 1860, slavery was solidly en-
trenched in the United States. In a short five years had come the progr-es-
sion : the freeing of slaves used for military purposes by the Army; the· pro-
hibition against returning slaves who crossed Union lines; the termination of 
slavery in the District of Columbia; the abandonment of fugitive slave laws; 
the Emancipation Proclamation; the first equal rights laws for the District 
of Columbia; the establishment of schools for all in the District; the admis-
sion of Negroes into the military forces; the elimination of restrictions against 
Negroes carrying the mails; the prohibitions of exclusion of Negroes from 
transportation in the District; and the Thirteenth Amendment itself.u 
The rapidity with which abolition proceeded makes it particularly mis-
leading to point to single examples of extant conditions with the assurance 
that the Fourteenth Amendment meant either to forbid or to perpetuate 
them. For example, when the Amendment was drafted, Massachusetts gave 
completely equal rights to Negroes, including their acceptance without seg-
regation in the common schools. But Indiana barred them from the schools 
altogether, forbade them to make enforceable contracts, did not let them 
testify in court, and excluded Negro newcomers from the state.10 
This very variety of policy highlighted the question of the status to be 
given the freedman. That question was broached, rather than resolved, by 
the Thirteenth Amendment. "Prior to that Amendment there were two prin-
cipal categories of persons in the United States, the slave and the free.n 
Emancipation did not necessarily move the Negroes from the one class to the 
other. In ancient civilizations, ". . . the world was not a place inhabited 
solely by free persons and slaves. Between men of these extremes of status 
9. The summary is taken from Wn.soN, HISTORY OF ANTI-SLAVERY MEAsUREs, 1861-
65, 346-352 (1865). 
10. Indianans were completely aware that equality meant a total change in their own 
treatment of Negroes. E.g., Speech, Governor 0. P. Morton of Indiana, Sept. 29, 1865 
(Lib. Cong. pamphlet), p. 13, 14; Report of S1~pt. of Public l11-struction, IND. Doc. J. 
337-39 (1865-66). 
11. There was of course a small class of free Negroes in the North and South·whose 
status, as is noted in the text, varied from state to state. 
HeinOnline  -- 50 Colum. L. Rev.  134 1950
134 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
stood social classes which lived outside the boundary of slavery but not yet 
within the circle of those who might rightly be called free."12 In this respect, 
antiquity might be reproduced, and a new class might be created by which 
the ex-slave would be placed in a social limbo, equ~valent perhaps to that of 
~e less happy castes of India. If the range of status from slavery to com-
plete freedom may be thought of as a scale, the reconstruction generation had 
to decide where within that scale the freedman should be placed. 
The Fourteenth Amendment was a ·merger of ideals and politics resulting 
from the desire to assure the rewards of victory to the various interests repre-
sented by the prevailing political factions in the Civil War and to maintain 
those factions in office. The Civil War precipitated a complete political and 
economic revolution in both the South and North which has led historians to 
call it the Second American Revolution. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and 
Fifteenth Amendments must be analyzed in part as the Second American 
Constitution. 
Although the Republican party, taking the nation as a whole, was still a 
minority group at the close of the Civil War, once the South was made im-
potent the way was clear for Republican dominance. The party itself was a 
coalition among three major groups-the Northern manufacturers hungering 
for high tariffs, the farmers of the Middle West desiring free lands, and the 
abolitionists.13 As is frequently the case, the product of this conglomeration 
contained elements designed to placate each. Tariffs were raised; free land 
was made available to the farmers; and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was 
passed to satisfy the abolitionists.14 The Fourteenth Amendment was also a 
result of the convergence of these divergent interests in the Republican party. 
Many felt that a variety of problems would be solved by granting the 
ballot to Negroes, for it was thought that the concomitant political power 
would be sufficient to protect their rights.15 As a further v~iue, Stevens saw 
the ascendancy of the Union party in the South as a result of such enfran-
chisement.16 Moreover, if the Negro were to vote Republican, he deserved 
Republican protection as much as the industrialists and farmers.17 Thus, 
Republicans could unanimously support an equal rights amendment as well as 
12. Westermann, Betwem Slavery ami Freedom, 50 AM. HisT. REv. 213, 214 (1945). 
13. 2 BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN CIVIUZATION 31 (1935). . 
14. 2 MoRRisoN AND CoMMAGER, . THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLic c. 1 
(1942). For an account of the economic situation of the South at the close of the war, 
see HEssELTINE, THE SoUTH IN AMERICAN HisTORY 482-489 (1943). For recognition 
that a new economic order was dependent upon the Republicans, see Address of Represen-
tative Boutwell, Reconstr11ction ami Its Relatio11s to the B11si11ess of the C01mtry, Dec. 27, 
1866 (Lib. Cong. pamphlet); CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 339 (1871) (speech by 
Representative Kelly). 
. 15. CARL ScHURZ PAPERS 279 (1913) ; 2 McPHERsoN's SCRAPBOOK, ELECTION 1866, 
at 26. 
· 16. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 252 (1867). 
17. 1 McPHERSoN's SCRAPBOOK, ELECTION 1866, at 143, 144. 
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an amendment for equal suffrage in the Southern states. The climate was not 
yet ripe for the North to impose equal suffrage upon itself, for few Northern 
states gave Negroes the ballot and the radicals doubted that such an Amendment 
would be ratified.1s 
Two different proposals were introduced by the Republicans to attain 
, their objectives. One of these was Bingham's equal rights amendment re-
ported out the Reconstruction Committee in February 1866. This proposal was 
soon postponed on the floor of the House because of the adverse sentiment it 
provoked.19 
On the political problem of suffrage, Blaine introduced an amendment 
which was successfully carried through the House in February 1866 with the 
aid of Stevens.20 The Blaine amendment was ingenious. Instead of impos-
ing Negro suffrage, it merely reduced a state's representation proportionately 
to the classes excluded. This would force the Southern states either to en-
franchise Negroes or to accept a sharply reduced representation, but would 
have little or no effect upon the Northern states with their tiny Negro popula-
tion. The Blaine amendment was defeated in the Senate by Sumner with a 
provocative two-day speech in which he declared that he would never permit 
a provision to enter the Constitution which implied that there might be less 
than complete equality.21 Thus, both the equal rights and suffrage proposals 
initially met defeat. 
The problem was solved by redrafting both proposals and combining 
them as sections one and two of the amendment, while adding a third section 
to keep prominent Confederates out of office and a fourth section to guarantee 
payment of the Northern, but not the Southern, war debt. This combination 
passed both houses as the Fourteenth Amendment, and accompanying legis-
lation made its ratification by Southern states a prerequisite to their readmis-
sion to Congress. 
Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment as it was thus passed contains 
the equal protection clause. Before the original meaning of it is discussed, 
we shall consider the source of the phrase; what men were associated with 
it; and why this particular language came into the Constitution at all. 
18. Cf. Editorial, Baltimore American, Jan. 2, 1866. See House, Norihem Congres-
sional Democrats as Defenders of the South during Reconstruction, 6 J. SouTHERN HisT. 
46 (1940); Simpson, Political Significance of Slave !Representation 1787-1821, 7 J. SoUTH-
ERN HIST. 315 (1941). 
19. For an account of the consideration of the Bingham amendment at this stage, see 
FLACK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 56-65 and ]AMES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 91-96. 
20. For an account of the Blaine amendment, see FLACK, op. cit. S11#a note 1, at 97 
et seq. 
21. The addresses on this topic are included in 10 SuMNER, op. cit. mpra note 3, at 
282, 338. His central theme was "Equal Rights of All, at the ballot box as 'in the court 
room." Id. at, 124. 
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' II. THE. GENESIS OF AN IDEA AND A PHRASE 
- "All men are created equal" and "equal protection of the Laws" are 
phrases which, though closely related, have had distinct histories and have 
served very different purposes in the course of slavery and freedom. 
Because of the first phrase, the Declaration of Independence became the 
rallying cry and the greatest verbal symbol of the abolitionists. With cheer- , 
ful disregard of the fact that it had been penned by slaveholders, the ab-
olitionists pre-empted the "created equal" slogan so successfully that their 
adversaries were finally forced into head-on attack on the slogan itself and 
even on the Declaration.22 
Like most great slogans, "created equal" provided no solution for con-
crete cases once slavery itself was abolished. For these cases, e.g., whether a 
freedman had a right to ride a street car, the abolitionists needed an instru-
ment more precise than their historic broadside. 
The transition from a slogan to a legal tool originated in a controversy 
over the admission of Negroes to Massachusetts schools. In 1845, the Massa-
chusetts legislature provided that Negroes should be educated in public 
schools. · The bill was passed under the vigorous leadership of Henry Wilson, 
prominent industrialist and abolitionist who later became United States Sena-
tor and Vice President and who had led the successful fight for repeal of the 
Massachusetts laws against miscegenation. In the State Senate in 1844 and 
1845, he had advocated the admission of Negroes onto ra:ilroad cars and had 
carried the fight for schools. His argument in the State Senate, which con-
stantly reiterated the theme of equality, was that Negroes should have "the 
full and equal ben~fits of our public schools."23 
Boston responded to the Wilson bill by establishing public but separate 
schools for Negro children. The validity of that arrangement came before the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1849 in Roberts v. Boston.24 Counsel for 
Roberts was Charles Sumner, a follower of Henry Wilson. Sumner's oral 
argument,25 ·distributed through Abolitionist ranks as a pamphlet, provided 
the intellectual material for the transition of "equality" from aphorism to 
legal tool. 
Sumner contended that separate schools were incompatible with both the 
statutes and ·constitution of Massachusetts. Since no word in either source 
specifically dealt with· the problem, he was forced to work from generaliza-
tions, and the fundamental generalization which he chose was the passage in 
the Massachusetts Constitution that "All men are born free and equal." 
22. See 2 SuMNER, OJ~. cit. supra note 3, at 331, n. 2. 
23. NASON, LIFE oF HENRY Wn.soN 48-50 (1876). 
24. 5 Cush. ).98 (Mass .. 1850). 
25. For a complete reprint of this argument, see 2 SuMNER, op, cit. s~tpra note 3, at 
327. 
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Recognizing the difference between a slogan and a proposition of law, Sumner 
said: 
Of Equality I shall speak, not as a sentiment, but as a principle. • . . 
Thus it is with all moral and political ideas. First appearing as a 
sentiment, they awake a noble impulse, filling the soul with generous 
sympathy, and encouraging to congenial effort. Slowly recognized, 
they finally pass into a formula, to be acted upon, to be applied, to 
be defended in the concerns of life, as principles.26 
For the purpose of creating the "formula, to be acted upon, to be ap-
plied," Sumner made the first known use in English of the phrase "equality 
before the law."27 He discussed the origins of equality the sentiment, find-
ing its traces in Herodotus, Seneca, and Milton,28 and then toqk up the ttansi-
tion into formula through the French Revolution and its predecessor philoso-
phers. Diderot and Rousseau, he explained, had acclimated the French to 
the sentiment, and the Revolutionary Constitution in 1791 took a new step. 
Its first article declared, "Men are born and continue free and equal· in their 
rights," thus marking the first occasion in which equality of rights was made 
a legal consequence of "created equal". Sumner traced th.e rest of the French 
experience: the Constitution of February 1793, which ha4 declared "The law 
ought to be equal for all;" the Constitution of June 1793, providing "All 
men are equal by nature and before the law;" and finally. the memorable 
crisp phrase in the Charter of Louis Phillipe, "Frenchmen are equal before 
the law." 
This principle of equality of rights, Sumner declared, was the real 
meaning of the Massachusetts Constitutional provision which gave equ~l 
rights to every human being.29 No distinctions whatsoever could validly be 
made because of race, and hence separate schools were illegal. 
The Massachusetts Court rejected Sumner's argument, but the legis-
lature thereupon overruled the court and explicitly provided that Negroes 
26. Ibid. This transition did not finally occur until the Fourteenth Amendment was 
ratified. GuTHRIE, LECTUREs ON THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT 110 (1898), observed 
that by it, equality passed from "a mere theory or sentiment" into "organic law." 
27. As will be shown, the phrase was already familiar in French as "Egalite devant 
Ia loi." 
28. BRANNON, THE FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT 317 (1901), would give Cicero a 
prominence in the development of the idea of equality which Sumner disregarded in this 
argument. Sumner's primary concentration in developing the origins of equality on classi-
cal and French sources is probably due to his own study in France. Trumbull referred to 
Blackstone as a starting point: " .•. the restraints introduced by the law should be equal 
to all, or as much so as the nature of things will admit." CoNG. GLOBE, 39 Cong., 1st Sess. 
474 (1866), quoting 1 BL. CoMM.,* 126, 127 (1807 ed.). On equality as an idea in politi-
cal thought, see Equality, 5 ENcYc. Soc. Scr. 574 (1931). 
29. "He may be poor, weak, humble, or black-he may be of Caucasian, Jewish, In-
dian, or Ethiopian race-he may be of French, Gen;ta_n, ~nglis~, or Irish ex~ction; but 
before the Constitution of Massachusetts all these distinctions disappear. He IS not poor, 
weak humble, or black; nor is he Caucasian, Jew, Indian, or Ethiopian; nor is he French, 
Germ'an, English, or Irish; he is a MAN, the equal of all his fellow-men." 2 SuMNEB, 
op. cit. supra note 3, at 341-42. . 
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. . 
should be admitted without separation into public schools.80 The argument, 
however, outlasted the case. "Equality before the law," used interchange-
ably with "equal rights," was a proposition by which particular proposals 
concerning freedmen could be measured. 
Sumner, as the foremost theoretician of the abolitionists. in high office, 
was the center of the move to write his formula into the Constitution. When 
the Thirteenth Amendment was before the Senate in 1864, its sponsors chose 
to use the language of the Northwest Ordinance as the base of their draft.81 
Sumner expressed no strong objection, since his first object was extinction of 
slavery by any formula; but he did suggest as a substitute for purposes of 
consideration a proposal that "All persons are equal before the law, so that 
no person can hold another as a slave."82 The Sumner phraseology, ob-
:viously careful, would write into the Constitution not merely the extinction 
of slavery but aJ,so the principle of equal rights, the demand of radicals every-
where.83 
Two proposals were the direct parents of the equal protection clause. 
·On December 6th, 1865, Representative Bingham of Ohio proposed an 
Amendnient authorizing Congress "to secure to all persons in every State of 
the Union equal protection in their rights, life, liberty, and property."84 It 
is, so far as we know, the first use of the phrase "equal protectio1;1" in a pro-
posed constitutional Amendment.85 
30. GEN. LAWS MASS., c. 256, § 1 (1855). 
31. Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance provides: "There shall be neither slavery 
nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, othenvise than in punishment of crimes, 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." 1 U.S.C. xxxv (1946). 
32. CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1482 (1864). 
33. Though ·the Sumner words were not adopted, the central idea of equality was 
generally in men's minds in connection with the Thirteenth Amendment. E.g., Represen-
tative Marcy opposed the Thirteenth Amendment because his constituents "do not believe 
that the black man is equal to the white," (id. at 2950), while Representative Orth sup-
ported it as a practical application of the proposition that "all men are created equal." 
CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142 (1865). Thereafter the idea stayed at the forefront 
of discussion. A Pennsylvania State Equal Rights League sigued its correspondence, 
"Yours for justice and equality before the law." Letter> to Stevens of Nov. 1, 1865, in 
STEVENS MANUSCRIPTS (Lib. Cong. 1865). One of Sumner's correspondents wrote, let 
us dictate "no distinction of color or person, all equal before the law." ]AMES, op. cit. 
supra note 1, at 31, quoting SUMNER's MANUSCRIPTs. 
Representative Justin Morrill of Vermont scribbled a note to Sumner asking for ad-
vice as to 'the best way to incorporate this sentiment into law: "Then as to apt phrase, 
can you leave all in a jural phrase. Say-all citizens of U.S. resident (in) said States 
are equal in their civil rights, immunities & privileges a11d equally entitled to protection in 
life, liberty and property •••• " ]AMES, op. cit. supra note 1, at 31, quoting SUMNER's 
·MANUSCRIPTS. There is no doubt that Sumner found this formulation adequate. For 
example, he proposed that Southerners take an oath that they would "discountenance and 
resist any laws making any distinction of race or color; and ••• strive to maintain a 
State government ••• where all men shall enjoy equal protection and equal rights.'' 
SuMNER, op. cit. supra note 3, at 22. 
34. See note 21 supra. 
35. The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 contained the phrase in a different con-
, text in its Article III: "And every denomination of Christians, demeaning themselves 
peaceably, and as good subjects of the Commonwealth, shall be equally under the protec-
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The other proposal originated in the Senate arid was the product of three 
bills. The first, S. 9, was sponsored by Senator Wilson and invalidated all 
laws "whereby or wherein any inequality of civil rights and immunities" 
existed because of "distinctions or differences of color, race or descent."36 
By whatever political agreement there may have been between Senator Trum-
bull and Wilson, 37 it developed that within a few days from the introduction of 
S. 9, Wilson introduced a new bill, S. 55, the first section of which was sub-
stantially the same as S. 9, and asked that it be referred to Trumbull's commit-
tee.38 S. 55 was never heard of again; but on the first day after the Christmas 
recess in 1865, Trumbull introduced S. 61 which was a broader bill containing 
verbatim the vital language of the earlier bi11.39 S. 61 was reported back from 
Trumbull's committee quickly and speedily became the Civil Rights Act of 
1866. 
As introduced by Trumbull, S. 61 reduced the somewhat lengthly lan-
guage of Section 1 of S. 55 (ne S. 9) to a phrase forbidding "discrimination 
in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State . . . on ac-
tion of the law." And see similarly N.H. CoNsT. AF:r. VI (1792) ; ME. CoNST. ART. I, § 3 
(1819). 
Conceptions similar to equal protection also existed in other early state constitutional 
provisions. Requirements of a uniform system of taxation in effect require equal protec-
tion in a narrow field. Levy v. Smith, 4 Fla. 154 (1851); State v. Lathrop, 10 La. Ann. 
398 (1855) ; Milwaukee & Miss. R. R. v. Supervisors, 9 Wis. 431, 449 (1855) ; cf. Smith 
v. Judge 12th District, 17 Cal. 548, 555 (1861). The common law distinction between 
general and special legislation was ancient, Holland's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 75 (1597) ; and 
distinctions in terms of the reasonableness of classifications in interpretations of provisions 
of this kind were becoming explicit before 1865. Reed v. State, 12 Ind. 641 (1859) ; 
Hingle v. State, 24 Ind. 28 (1865); cf. Madison & Ind. R. R. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217, 
240-43 (1856). 
The expression "equal protection" had been used by Bingham as early as 1857 in a 
fashion indicating that he then made no distinction between it and due process. CoNG. 
GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 140 (App. 1857). On this and other occasions before the War, 
Bingham developed extensively a trinitarian theme of "privileges and immunities", "due 
process", and "equality'', CoNG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (App. 1856) ; id., 34th 
Cong., 3d Sess. 140 (App. 1857); id., 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984-985 (1859). We find the 
actual phrase "equal protection", however, used only on the occasion mentioned. 
36. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1865). 
37. Although this is somewhat of a speculation, Trumbull was facing re-election in 
Illinois early in 1866 and needed the strength which might come from participating spec-
tacularly in Reconstruction policy. In the campaign, a major issue developed as to 
whether Trumbull was really the author of the sentence in the Civil Rights Act of 1866 
declaring Negroes to be citizens, but Trumbull made no claim to drafting the rest of the 
Act. See McPHERSoN's SCRAPBOOK, ELECTION OF 1866, at 122-32. 
38. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 108, 111 (1865). Section two of S. 55, in the 
Library of Congress printed bills collection, provided: "All inhabitants of any State or 
Territory of the United States, without distinction of color or race, shall be entitled to 
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence in all courts and causes, 
to lease, purchase, hold, sell, and convey real and personal property, and to have full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and estate." 
39. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 129, 184 (1866). For general historical sur-
veys of events in Congress during the Thirty-ninth Congress, see BARNEs, THE THIRTY: 
NINTH CoNGRESS (1867) (amounts to extended sununary of the Globe); WILsoN, HISTORY 
OF RECONSTRUCTION MEASURES, 1865-68 (1868) j BEALE, THE CRITICAL YEAR (1930) 
(conservative viewpoint) j 5 RHODES, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES c. 30 (1906) (rad-
ical); 2 BLAINE, TwENTY YEARs IN CoNGRESS c. 5 (1884); 2 FESSENDEN, WILLIAM PITT 
FESSENDEN' 60 et seq. (1907) ; MILLER, THADDEUS STEVENs c. 20 (1939). 
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count of race, color, or previous condition of slavery.'' Section two of S. 55, 
retained virtually intact by Trumbull, named specific rights to be enjoyed 
"without distinction of color or race," and concluded that all inhabitants 
should have "full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the se· 
curity of person and estate." In this form, S. 61 passed the Senate. As 
Trumbull said, its object was "to break down all discrimination between 
black men and white men."40 Senator Howard of Michigan, one of the 
drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment and a member of the Joint Committee 
on Reconstruction shortly to prepare the Fourteenth Amendment, concurred : 
"In respect to all civil rights, there is. to be hereafter no distinction between 
the white race and the black race.''41 
The House eliminated some of the language in S. 61. Members dis· 
agreed among themselves as to what the phrase "civil rights or immunities" 
might mean, and this vagueness caused it to disappear f~om the Bill,42 though 
the "equal benefits" phrase remained. Bingham opposed the Bill on the floor 
of the House, being the only Radical to do so, on the ground that it should 
await a broader Constitutional foundation than the Thirteenth Amendment. 
He insisted that there must be a new Amendment which would eliminate all 
"discrimination between citizens on account of race or color in civil rights."43 
Immediately after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Joint 
Committee on Reconstruction presented the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
actual drafting of the first section was done by Bingham. For the equality 
clause he had before him two precedent phrases, his own "equal protection 
in their rights" and the Wilson-Trumbull Civil Rights language, 11equal 
benefit of all laws.'' It· seems clear that he combined the two phrases and 
thus arrived at the formula "equal protection of the laws." More important, 
he avoided the quandary that he himself bad seen in the Civil Rights Bill 
which in the Senate draft gave equality in vague categories of cases. Bing· 
ham dropped the limitations, making the equality co-extensive with the broad 
claims of Negro rights espoused by his fellow dominant members of theRe· 
construction Committee, Stevens and Howard.44 
When the Fourteenth Amendment reached the floor, and indeed when it 
was before the country, only general attention was given to the first section, 
40. CoNG. GLoBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 599 (1866). 
41. Id. at 504. 
42. For various statements of doubt as to meaning, see CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1117, 1121, 1268-71, 1290-93 (1866) (remarks of Wilson, Roger, Kerr, Bingham). 
43. Id. at 1291, 1293. 
44. The Stevens proposal had been that all laws should be "equally applicable to every 
citizen, and no discrimination shall be made on account of race and color." CoNG. GLOBE, 
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1865). The Howard view was that "in respect to all civil rights, 
there is to be hereafter no distinctions between the white race and the black race." I d. at 
504. 
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and particularly the equal protection clause. Primary attention of all was on 
the political· sections .. 46 
The principal statements made on the floor of Congress concerning the 
first section were to the effect that it put the Civil Rights Act of 1866 beyond 
the reach of repeal.46 Randall, as a leading Democrat in opposition, pro-
tested that "equality in every respect between the two races" should not be 
ordered by Congress.47 The typical House statement on equal protection 
was so general as to have no particular meaning.48 Senator Howe, a promi-
nent Republican, listed as elements of equal protection the right to hold land 
which has been purchased, the right to collect wages, and the right to appear 
in Court and give testimony; but he stressed that "these are not the only 
rights," and added, as an example of a denial ·of equal rights, Florida's dis-
crimination between the races in educational systems.49 Senator Howard, 
floor leader for the Amendment in the Senate, summarized the meaning of the 
clause thus : it "abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with 
the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to 
another." Howard finally reduced the clause to the familiar phrase: "It 
establishes equality before the law .... "60 
We conclude ·~1at the fundamental working legal theory of equality be-
fore the law, or equal rights, or equal protection was formulated for Ameri-
can law by Sumner, and popularized under his leadership. The actual lan-
guage of equal protection found its way into the Constitution from the Sum-
ner draft of the 13th Amendment, to the Wilson draft of the Civil Rights 
Bill, through Trumbull as public sponsor of the Civil Rights Bill, and ce~­
tainly through Bingham. 
To this group of the four "insiders" must be added the eleven majority 
members other than Bingham of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 
45. Republicans were jubilant over the fact that the South would lose 25 of its 75 
representatives unless it admitted Negroes to suffrage and that Confederate leaders would 
be disqualified from office. Only ten of several hundred newspaper clippings related to 
Section One of the Amendment. McPHERSON's SCRAPBOOK, THE FoURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT. 
46. See, e.g., opening statement of Stevens in support of the Amendment, CoNG. 
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866). . 
47. I d. at 2530. 
48. E.g., the observations of Representative Farnsworth which consist largely of 
elaborate repetition of the phrase. I d. at 2539. 
49. Id. at 217, 219 (App.) 
50. I d. at 2766. After passage by Congress, the Amendment went to the state legisla-
tures for ratification. What few fragments there are relevant to the interpretation of 
equal protection have not been very helpful. Typical is the fairly meaningless comment 
of Governor F. F. Low of California, in recommending ratification to his state legislature: 
"This section declares 'equality before the law' for all citizens, in the solemn and binding 
form of a constitutional enactment, to which no reasonable objection can be urged." 
CALIF. SEN, J. 49 (1867-68). Governor Curtin of Pennsylvania, in his message recom• 
mending ratification, thought the meaning of Section One too obvious for serious com-
ment. 1 P A. ExEc. Docs. (Jan. 2, 1867). · 
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from which the Amendment act~ally emerged. The total number of "in~ 
siders" is thus fifteen, and a central inquiry is the determination of the mean .. 
ing of equal protection to them. 
On the specific problems of equality considered, for example the nature 
of the equal right to testify, to sue, and to hold property, this group appears 
to have been a unit in meaning. Their stand on specific ques'tions is out~ 
lined in sectjons following. On the broader question of whether equal pro-
tection would, under any circumstances, permit laws making distinctions 
based on race or color, there is less uniformity and less precise evidence. We 
conclude that of the 15, Sumner, Wilson, Bingham, Howard, Stevens, Conk-
ling, Boutwell, and Morrill probably accepted an interpretation of equal pro-
tection which precluded any use whatsoever of color as a basis of legal 
distinctions.51 Trumbull, Fessenden, and Grimes, on some occasions, counte-
nanced some types of segregation, at least as to miscegenation.U2 The po-
sitions of Harris, Williams, Blow, and Washburne are unascertained,li8 
III. INTERPRETATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION DURING RECONSTRUCTION 
The Slaughterhouse Cases in 18?'3 ·gave this interpretation to the equal 
protection clause: "We doubt very much whether any action of a State not 
directed by way of discrimination against the Negroes as a class, or on ac-
count of their race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this pro-
vision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency [the 
Black Codes], that a strong case would be necessary for its application to 
51. Nothing need be added to the text references as to Sumner, Wilson, Howard, and 
Stevens. Conkling's position is established by his regular support of the Sumner Civil 
Rights Bill of 1875, discussed at length infra, as is Morrill's and Boutwell's; and in addi-
tion Boutwell, as a typical Massachusetts abolitionist, held the view: that he would posi-
tively require intermingling of the races to break down prejudices. CoNG. GLOBE, 43d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 4116 (1874). Morrill consistently opposed any distinctions based on 
color. Id. at 2240. The case as to Bingham is less clear, because his preoccupation with 
his own Amendment was largely with the privileges and immunities clause. We know 
that he thought appropriate language should eliminate "all discrimination between citizens 
on account of race or color in civil rights." CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1293 
(1866). Since Bingham opposed the Civil Rights Act solely because he thought it should 
await passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, we assume that he thought the Amendment 
would at least cover that wide area of state discriminatory legislation. 
52. These three Senators shortly split off from the radical wing of the Republican 
party, being among the seven Republicans who supported Johnson on impeachment. Both 
Fessenden and Trumbull believed that the Civil Rights Act and the Amendment did not 
affect anti-miscegenation legislation. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322, 505 (1866). 
Grimes saw no inequality in segregated transportation, CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 
3133 (1864), although Trumbull seems to have had the opposite point of view on this ques-
tion. I d. at 3132. SALTER, LIFE OF J. W. GRIMES 276-322 (1876), covers the years 1865-
67 in Grimes' life and reveals no substantial interest in either the Amendment or recon-
struction. 
53. All four were routine radicals. Harris and Williams each served only one term 
in the Senate, and Blow served two terms in the House. Harris, Blow, and Washburne 
came to Congress with strong anti-slavery backgrounds. We have found no statements by 
any of the four which would give an indication of the breadth of equal protection to them, 
HeinOnline  -- 50 Colum. L. Rev.  143 1950
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 143 
any other."li4 This was narrow construction with a vengeance, and Justice 
Miller, its author, quickly recanted.li5 It was obvious from the discussion of 
the Amendment, its background, and its contemporary interpretation, that the 
clause reached all racial classifications, including groups other than Negroes.56 
Miller's observation, however, certainly did not conflict with contempo-
rary understanding as to economic regulatory action unrelated to. racial dis-
tinctions. Although there is little doubt that Republicans would have ap-
proved of restraints upon regulation of business had they thought of it, we 
have not found anywhere even a single intimation that this possibility did in 
fact occur to them. 57 In other words, there was no contemporary understand-
ing of the relation of equal protection to business regulation. 
A. Eqttality in Cottrts and Commerce 
Under the pre-rebellion black codes, the free Negro's position differed 
little from that of the slave, except that a freedman had the right to the 
fruits of his own labor, usually the right to hold personal property, and in a 
few states the right to hold real property.58 Also, he ranked a step above 
the slave in the law courts. The slave, of course, could not sue in the courts, 
since any rights of action arising out of transactions in which he was in-
volved were the property of his master.59 The free Negro could own rights 
of action, but like a minor, could frequently enforce them only by a suit 
through a guardian or next friend, a white man; and he could be a witness 
only in actions where only Negroes were involved.60 
In criminal law, the status of the free Negro was about on a par with 
that of the slave. Frequently statutes imposing liability on one imposed it on 
the other as well. Arson, burglary, mayhem (against a white person), rape 
or attempted rape (against a white person) were typical capital crimes both 
for slave and for free Negro.61 Preaching the gospel, using insulting lan-
guage to white' persons, assembling together to learn to read and write: these 
54. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 81 (1873). 
55. FAIRMAN, MR. JusTICE MILLER 186, 187 (1939). 
56. Cf. Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 12 Fed. Cas. 252, No. 6,546 (C.C. Cal. 1879) (equal 
protection extended to Chinese); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
57. There is, however, clear evidence that Congressmen were aware that the language 
was broader than the immediate evil faced. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766, 
1063-64 (1866) (statements of Howard and Stevens). 
58. E.g., COBB'S NEW DIG. LAWS GA. 993, 995 (1851). 
59. LA. ClVII< CoDE, Arts. 174, 175, 177 (1838). One of the rare exceptions to this 
proposition is Sally's Guardian v. Beaty, 1 Bay 260 (S.C.l792), in which a slave was held 
to have the right to purchase and emancipate another slave. The leading collection. of 
materials on legal aspects of the slavery system is 4 CATTERALL, ]UDIClAL CASES CoN-
CERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY (1936). 
60. CoBB, op. cit. supra note 58, at 973, 985, 988, 999; Miss. REv. CoDE, c. 33, Art. 62 
(1857). 
61. LA. BLACK CoDE, CRIMINAL OFFENSES § 7 (1806) ; CoBB, op. cit. supra note 58, at 
987. 
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'\vere typical misdemeanors for the Negro, slave or free.62 Except in capital 
cases, the Negro, slave or free, was tried by a jury of slaveholders, who 
could convict by a majority vote.oa 
The black codes after the War perpetuated or created many discrimi-
nations in the criminal law by applying unequal penalties to Negroes for rec-
ognized offenses and by specifying offenses for Negroes only. 64 Laws which 
prohibited Negroes from keeping weapons or from selling liquor were typical 
of the latter. Examples of discriminatory penalties were the laws which 
made it a capital offense for a Negro to rape a white woman, or to assault a 
white woman with intent to rape, or the ingenious bit of foresight by which 
the South Carolina legislature made it a felony without benefit of clergy "for 
a person of color to have sexual intercourse with a white woman by personat-
ing ·her husband."65 
In addition to the discriminations of the criminal laws, post-war Black 
Codes hedged in the Negroes with a series of restraints on their business 
dealings of even the simplest form. Though in many states the Negro could 
acquire property, Mississippi put sharp limitations on that right.60 But most 
restrictive were the provisions concerning contracts for personal service. 
Many statutes called for specific enforcement of labor contracts against freed-
men, with provisions to facilitate capture should a freedman try to escape. 
Vagrancy laws made it a misdemeanor for a Negro to be without a long-term 
contract of employment; conviction was followed by a fine, payable by a 
white man who could then set the criminal to work for him until the bene-
factor had been completely re-imbursed for his generosity. Minors were re-
membered in compulsory apprenticeship laws which arranged for long-term 
instruction in the arts of hoeing and cotton-picking. Not infrequently there 
were provisions that the former owner should have first call upon the labor of 
an ex-slave.67 
Congress of necessity had given considerable thought to the problems 
facing the Southern States. As arbiter of procedure for Federal Courts and 
62. Miss. REv. ConE, c. 33, Art. 84 (1857) ; LA. BLACK ConE § 40 (1806) ; Conn, op. 
cit. supra note 58, at 1001, 1005. 
63. CoBB, o/J. cit. s1tpra note 58, at 986; Miss. REv. ConE, c. 33, Art. 68 (1857). 
64. For a collection of the black codes, see McPHERSON, HANDBOOK OF POLITICS l'OR 
1868 29-44 (1868) ; 1 FLEMING, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION c. 4 (1906}, 
These codes were never in effect for a substantial length of time. McPHERSON, op. est. 
supra, at 36-38. 
For the most valuable contemporary description of the South in the immediate post-
Appomattox period, see 2 SEN. Doc. No.2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1865) (report by Major 
General Carl Schurz). Although it is frankly partisan in its radical viewpoint, it is 
nevertheless important for understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, for it is what the 
radicals believed and acted upon. 
65. 13 S.C. STAT. 277 (1865). 
66. LAws OF Miss. 82 (Reg. Sess. 1865). 
67. ALA. Acrs 120 (1865-1866); 13 S.C. STAT. 302 (1865) (employees forbidden to 
leave master's premises without permission). 
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as legislator for the District of Columbia, Congress had faced essentially the 
same problems in converting from a slave system to a free one. In 1862 
Congressional action applieable to the District abolished slavery,68 repealed 
the Black Codes,69 and prohibited exclusion of witnesses on account of 
color.70 On July 2, 1864, there was passed Senator Sumner's amendment to 
the Civil Appropriation Bill which provided that witnesses could no longer 
be excluded on account of color in the Federal courts.71 
Congress began the uprooting of these codes outside the District of Co-
lumbia with the Civil Rights Act of 1866. It provided: 
... citizens, of every race and color ... shall have the same right, 
in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and en-
force contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, 
and to full and equal benefit of all laws and pro_ceedings for the se-
curity of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and 
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none 
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the con-
trary notwitbstanding.72 
As can be seen, that Act dealt explicitly with the inequalities of the 
Black Codes in criminal and commercial law, and its principles passed into 
the equal protection clause. Indeed, Stevens occasionally defined Negro 
equality in terms of these obvious discriminations: " ... the same law which 
punishes one man shall punish any other for the same offense; .- .. the law 
which gives a verdict to one man shall render the same verdict to another, 
whether he is Dutch, Irish, or N egro."73 He assured Congress when he pre-
sented the Fourteenth Amendment that Negroes would be subject·to equal 
punishments, and would receive equal "means of redress" and equal right to 
testify.74 The Act and the Amendment obliterated the commercial discrimi-
nations by giving Negroes equal rights to contract and to be subject to no 
vagrancy laws which did not apply to whites. 
Considerable doubt exists as to whether the equal protection clause was 
meant to confer equality in jury service. The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 
which was quite explicit in its language, said nothing of jury service; "equal 
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property" 
was the only language under which jury service could conceivably come. 
68. 12 STAT. 376 (1862). 
69. 12 STAT. 407 (1862). 
70. 12 STAT. 539 (1862). 
71. 13 STAT. 351 (1864). 
72. 14 STAT. 27 (1866). 
73. Speech at Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Sept. 27, 1866, in 1 McPHERSON's SCRAPBOOK, 
CAMPAIGN OF 1866, at 48. 
74. This subject was e.'l:haustively considered in SEN. REP. No. 25, 38th Cong., 1st 
, Sess. (1864) (Committee on Slavery and Freedmen). · 1 • • • 
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Representative Wilson, 'floor leader for the bill, stated in debate that the Act 
would not affect 'jury service.75 During the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself, no discussion of this point was had. Congress first acted 
to adrriit Negroes to juries in the District of Columbia in 1867,70 labelling its 
bill an "eqtial rights" measure, although it had enacted five years earlier a 
provision requiring colored persons there to be subject to the same laws as 
free whites.77 The Civil Rights Act of 1875 contained the first explicit pro-
vision fo~ non-discrimination by states in jury service, indicating a subse-
quent judgment by 1he authors of the Amendment that jury service was in-
cluded.78 The Supreme Court promptly upheld the Act as within the equal 
protection clause.79 It seems ·f~r to conclude that, while Congress did not 
have jury service in mind in 1866 as a civil right, the language of the Amend-
ment was broad enough to cover jury service in the apparent absence of any 
intent to the contrary. 
Cases speedily came to lower courts testing the meaning of the Act, anti 
it was interpreted as expected. A Delaware court held that Negroes could 
not testify regardless of the Act,80 but Justice Swayne in a federal circuit 
court held to the contrary.81 George Ruby, a freedman beaten up by a New 
Orieans mob for teaching school, made history in Louisiana by being allowed 
to testify in the resultant assault case.82 The Attorney General of Tennessee 
declared that he would resist the Civil Rights Act by keeping Negroes out of 
the tippling·house and billiard trade; but the Memphis criminal court speedily 
overruled him with the pronouncement that "Negroes of Memphis may now 
·open as many billiard saloons as they want."S3 
In its criminal law aspect, the clause was the broadest possible general-
ization. To some it was the American equivalent of the pledge of Magna 
·Carta: "We will sell to no man, we will deny to no man, we will delay to no 
man right or justice."84 
75. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866). Representative Wilson should 
not be confused with Senator Wilson. See also editorial to effect that jury duty is not a 
civil right. McPHERSON's SCRAPBOOK, CIVIL RIGHTS BlLL OF 1866, at 41. 
76 . . CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 727 (1867). The measure was pocket vetoed 
and then repassed in the next session as a measure "for the further security of equal 
rights." CoN G. GLOBE, 40th .Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 96 ( 1867). Again pocket vetoed, it 
finally was passed in Grant's administration. 16 STAT. 3 (1869). 
77. 12 STAT. 407 (1862). 
78. 18 STAT. 336 (1875), 8 U.S.C. §44 (1946). Senator Carpenter ably opposed this 
provision, contending that jury service was a political, and not a civil, right; but he was 
over-ridden by his colleagues. See note 151 i11fra. 
79. E~ parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1879). Justice Field, dissenting, espoused 
the Carpenter position that jury service was a political right. Id. at 367, 368. 
80. McPHERSON's SCRAPBOOK, CIVIL RIGHTS BILL OF 1866, at 149. 
81. United States v. Rhodes, 27 Fed. Cas. 785, No. 16,151 (C.C. Ky. 1866). 
82. McPHERsoN's SCRAPBOOK, CIVIL RIGHTS BILL OF 1866, at 115, 116. 
83. Id. at 109, 119. 
84. "Nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus rectum vel justitiam." The 
clause was given this florid interpretation by Bingham and Edmunds. CoNG. GtoDE, 42nd 
Cong., 1st Sess. 697 (1871); id. at 81, 83 (App.). 
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B. Segregation 
For the most part, the rights discussed above raise no possibility of rec-
onciling equality with separation of Negroes from whites. The right to 
testify, for example,. could not rationally be made a right to testify only in 
the presence of Negroes. On the other hand, a right to equal transportation 
could, at least without being as irrational, be a right to separate transpor-
tation. 
Segregation, with its legal corollary of "separate but equal," is a term 
which our generation applies loosely as a unitary concept to cover the entire 
area in which separation of the races is feasible. This concept has been ap-
plied to such disparate situations as separation in transportation, schools, 
drinking fountains, housing, churches, hotels, restaurants, theaters, health 
services, employment opportunities, and cemeteries.85 
Difficulty exists in discovering the original meaning of ·equal protection 
as it relates to this problem because it never occurred to a substantial number 
of persons in the decade under study to approach this question in any such 
unitary way. Three distinct views can be identified. The abolitionist view 
of equality, represented by Sumner, permitted absolutely no distinctions of 
any kind based on color. Directly opposite was the views of the opponents of 
the Civil Rights Bill and the Fourteenth Amendment with their rough slogan 
of "no nigger equality."86 Both of these groups may fairly be described as 
having a unitary concept of segregation. The abolitionists were against it 
in every context, though on this point no direct discussion among them has 
been found for the critical year of 1866. Some conservatives approved of 
segregation in all respects,87 professing to believe that equal protection oblit-
erated every restraint on intermingling.8~ This interpretation of equal pro-
tection probably was taken by them only as conventional opposition party Cas-
sandras, for after the Amendment was adopted the conservatives frequently 
gave a very narrow construction of the terms they had once thought so broad. 
85. See MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA c. 28 (1944). 
86. Senator Saulsbury of Delaware consistently represented this view. CONG. GLOBE, 
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1141, 1364 (1864). Contrast the resolution of the Republican State 
Convention at Syracuse, New York, in 1866, declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment 
terminated the old maxim "This is a white man's government", 1 McPHERSON's SCRAP-
BOOK, ELECriON OF 1866, at 3, with the opposition slogans: Placard of the Seventh Ward 
Johnson club in New York City at a Union Square rally, "No Negro equality", id. at 
79; Address of General Spinola at a Johnson meeting in New York, "Every man who 
••• rejects the Negro as his equal •.. will sustain the President," id. at 61; or the 
editorial of the St. Louis Republican supporting the Johnson veto of the Civil Rights 
Bill, "The President put his foot down on nigger equality." McPHERsoN's SCRAPBOOK, 
CIVIL RIGHTS BILL OF 1866, at 54. 
87. For example, Senator Hendricks of Indiana, a conservative, said that giving 
Negroes the right to testify, to be jurors, or to be in the same street cars with white 
persons was all of one erroneous piece: "These all stand upon the proposition that the 
Negro is the equal of the white man." CoNG. GLoBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 839 (1864). 
88. See, e.g., remarks of Senators Cowan and Johnson, CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st 
Sess;. 500, 505 (1866). 
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Between these two extreme positions was a middle group which in the 
years 1865-68 in particular never had to take a stand on the problem as a whole 
because its outlines were not clearly perceived. Segregation, as compared, 
for instance, with twenty days hard labor for preaching the gospel, is a fairly 
refined development in the history of discrimination. In the South, with 
slavery just abolished, discrimination against the Negro which angered Con-
gress was of a much cruder kind. 
It is not surprising that Congress, concerned with securing to the freed-
man the most fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property, should not have 
devoted much time in its first post-war sessions to considering where he should 
sit in theaters and trains. Because the problem of segregation was never 
squarely faced during the incubation period of the Amendment, the task of 
interpreting mass opinion on equal protection with absolute assurance be-
comes impossible. This difficulty is heightened by acceptance in the middle 
group of a formula which evades precise analysis. Under that middle ap-
proach, there were three types of equality with corresponding rights : political 
equality, civil equality, and social equality. The equal protection clause was 
clearly not intended to include the right to vote.89 Putting the question of 
political equality a.15ide, this group made a hazy division between the other two 
terms, believing that equal.protection granted "civil equality" but not "social 
equality." A typical example of a use of this conception by a supporter of 
the Amendment is Greeley's observation: "You can't make all men equal 
socially. One is stronger, better, braver than the other. Now what I want is 
that all men should be equal before the law. I want the black man to have 
his rights all over the South. The law should know nothing about a man's 
color."90 
One central theme emerges from the talk of "social equality": there are 
two kinds of relations of men, those that are controlled by the law and those 
that are controlled by purely personal choice. The former involves civil 
rights, the latter social rights. There are statements by proponents of the 
Amendment from which a different definition coul~ be taken, but this seems 
89. The history of the Amendment proves conclusively that the radicals were unable 
to deal with the suffrage problem at that time except by the circumlocutions of Section 
two of the Amendment. The whole reason for radical opposition to the Amendment was 
its failure to give complete and equal suffrage. The majority of the Massachusetts 
House Committee recommended against the Amendment because it permitted disfranchise· 
ment of Negroes, while the minority favored ratification but asked for an additional 
amendment on universal suffrage. MAss. LEG. Doc., H. R. REP. No. 149, 4, 15 (1867). 
It follows that Nixon Y. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), invalidating a Texas statute 
barring Negroes from voting on the ground that the statute denied equal protection, was 
not in accord with the original understanding of equal protection; but the subsequent de-
cision in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), returned to the original plan of the 
War Amendments by invalidating a similar Texas statute under the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, rather than the Fourteenth. 
90. 1 McPHERSoN's SCRAPBOOK, ELECI'ION OF 1866, at 117-18. 
HeinOnline  -- 50 Colum. L. Rev.  149 1950
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 149 
to be the usual one. Frequently, of course, the terms were used with no con-
tent at all, as when a Pennsylvania Republican simply told his audience that 
the Amendment granted civil rights but not social rights ;91 but when analysis 
began, the explanation given above usually appeared. 
Thus, in one debate Senator Harlan of Iowa explained that the right of 
Negroes to use the street cars did not involve social equality since that right 
was legal in origin.92 Normally the hotel keeper's responsibility not to discrim-
inate was explained in terms of a distinction between taking a Negro into the 
hotel or dining room, as distinguished from putting him into a particular 
room or at a particular table: the hotel keeper's obligation to take cust.omers 
rested on law, but the right to choose one's own table-mate was "social."93 
Stevens himself stressed the vital distinction between matters of law and 
matters of taste : "This doctrine does not mean that a Negro shall sit on the 
same seat or eat at the same table with a white man. That is a matter of 
taste which every man must decide for himself. The law has nothing to do 
with it."04 
Thus the original distinction appears to have been that the law should 
know no distinctions of color, but that personal taste should be left to govern 
itself. In this the practical difference between the abolistionist and the middle 
position was tqat the abolitionists as a moral matter encouraged complete 
intermingling even though this entered the zone of taste, while the middle 
group lacked any such fervor. 
Because the civil-social distinction was misty, it is easiest to diagnose 
original opinion by studying its application to concrete cases. 
1. Geographical segregation. Restrictions of Negroes to particular re-
gions of the country, or to particular areas in a city by limiting their right to 
buy and live on particular pieces of property, is the most obvious kind of 
segregation to have been forbidden by equal protection. As has already been 
noted, Illinois and Indiana excluded all Negro immigration into the state 
prior to the Civil War; and the Southern states by old and new codes for 
freedmen e..'Ccluded them from particular areas and from buying real estate. 
Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided that ."citizens of 
every race and color . . . shall have the same right in every State . . , . to 
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop-
erty. . . ." President Johnson, in his veto message, specifically challenged 
the right of Congress to "abrogate all State laws of discrimination between 
91. 2 McPHERSON's SCRAPBOOK, ELECTION OF 1866, at 37. 
92. CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 839 (1864). . 
93. See, e.g., 2 CONG. REc. 4082 (1874) (remarks of Senator Pratt of Indiana). 
94. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 252 (1867). 
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the two races in the matter of real estate."05 The veto was overridden, and 
it was proclaimed by every advocate of the Fourteenth Amendment that it 
carried the principles of the Act into the Constitution. 
There are many points of doubt in the determination of the original un~ 
derstanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, but on this one, we think there 
is no room for serious difference of opinion. In view of the specific grant 
in the Civil Rights Act of "the same right" to hold and use property, no dis~ 
tinctions whatsoever based on race: or color could be made in respect to this 
right. Geographic segregation was completely forbidden. 
2. Segregation in Transportation. The type of segregation most fre~ 
quently considered between 1865 and 1875 was segregation in transportation. 
Berore the Civil Rights Act of 1866, attention focused largely on trans~ 
portation in: Washington. Th.ereafter, the issue was widespread as Negroes 
sought to utilize the privileges they thought the Act had given them. The 
central legal theory of the attack on segregated transportation was that trans~ 
poration companies had a common law duty to take all comers and that mak~ 
ing any distinctions in the operation of this duty because of color denied an 
equal right to contract for transportation. The vital distinctions are high~ 
lighted by Senator Reverdy Johnson of Maryland, perhaps the ablest consti~ 
tutionalist of the conservative faction : 
It may be convenient, because it meets with the public wish or 
with the public taste of both classes, the white and the black, that 
there should be cars in which the white men and ladies are to travel, 
· designated for that purpose, and cars in which the black men and 
black women are to travel, designated for that purpose. But that is 
a matter to be decided as between these two classes. There is no 
more right to exclude a black man from a ear designated for the 
transportation of white persons than there is a right to refuse to 
transport in a car designated for black persons white men.96 
The matter was repeatedly before Congress. The Senate voted against 
segregated transportation in one form or another at least six times from 1863 
to 1875. In 1863, CoiJ.gress amended the charter of the Alexandria and 
Washington Railroad and provided that "No person shall be excluded from 
tlie·cars on account of color."97 A year later the Washington and GeorgeM 
town Railroad, a street railway in the District of Columbia, excluded a Negro 
army officer from a car. The District Committee, after an investigation in 
response to a request by Sumner, reported that no legislation was necessary; 
the major could sue because "colored persons are entitled to all the privileges 
95. 6 RICHARDSON, MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS. 405, 407 (1897). 
96.· CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1156 {1864). 
97. 12 STAT. 805 (1863). 
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of said road which any other persons have."98 The company attempted to 
propitiate this sentiment by putting on more cars for the exclusive use of 
Negroes, a concession which gave Sumner no comfort because "whenever they 
exclude a colored person from anyone of their cars they dO' it in violation of 
law."99 
Sumner thereupon embarked upon a crusade to eliminate street car seg-
gregation in the District. He successfully carried an Amendment to the 
charter of the Depot and Ferry Co. Railway by a vote of 24 to 6, that "no 
person shall be excluded from any car on account of color."100 He lost, 14 to 
16, an effort to put a similar provision into the Washington and Georgetown 
Railway charter because some radicals thought it unnecessary in view of the 
clarity of the law; but finally he achieved complete victory in 1864 and 1865 
when he carried an amendment to the Metropolitan Railway Company's 
Chart~r by which the prohibition against exclusions from any car because of 
color was "extended to every other railroad in the District of Columbia."101 
All this debate upon the whole issue of segregation in transportation took 
place before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment .. Those who op-
posed the measures contended that segregation was perfectly valid. Senator 
Saulsbury of Delaware, for example, said such legislation would be "a war 
against nature and n~ture's God."102 More restrained Senators such as 
Grimes and Doolittle argued merely that there was no harm in separation.103 
Those who supported the legislation did so on grounds of equality. Senator 
Wilson denounced the "Jim Crow car" -to make Negroes stand on a front 
platform, he said, was "in defiance of decency."104 Sumner observed of Mas-
sachusetts that there "the rights of every colored person are placed on an · 
equality with those of white persons. They have the same right with white 
persons to ride in every public conveyance in the commonwealth."105 He 
asked the same ru1e of equality for the District. 
The first of the Sumner amendments came before the Supreme Court in 
Railroad Co. v. Brown/06 a case which is an important part of this history. On 
February 8th, 1868, Catharine Brown, colored, bought a ticket on the Alex-
andria and Washington Railway. That company, its charter containing the 
Amendment providing that "no person shall be excluded from the cars on 
account of color,'' maintained two identical and connected cars, using one for 
98. SEN. REP. No. 17, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. (1864). 
99. CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 817 (1864). 
100. CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. 294 (1865). 
101. CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 3131-3135 (1864). 
102. CoNG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1141 (1864). 
103. !d. at 1159, 3133. -
104. !d. at 3132, 3133. 
105. !d. at 1158. 
106. 17 Wall. 445 (U.S. 1873). 
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colored and the other for white passengers. When Mrs. Brown attempted to 
sit in the "white" car, she was ejected with great violence. 
The episode attracted immediate attention because Mrs. Brown was in 
charge of the ladies' rest room at the Senate. An immediate Senate investi-
gation was undertaken to explore whether the company's charter should be re-
pealed. One hearing was held in the shanty in which Mrs. Brown lived and 
was recuperating. The Committee concluded that the company had violated 
its charter. , It recommended against repeal of the charter because it thought 
compensation by judicial proceedings would be adequate, but it concluded: "If 
the result of the legal proceedings which Mrs. Brown has instituted should 
not be satisfactory, or if the conduct of the said Company in the future shall 
not be satisfactory, the resolution can be taken from the table, and the charter 
of the Company repealed."107 
The company, contending that segregation was "reasonable and legal," 
asked for a charge to the jury that it was under no obligation to plaintiff to do 
more than offer separate but equal cars. The trial court rejected the charge, 
and the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, rejecting the "separate but 
equal" argument as "an ingenious attempt to evade a compliance with the ob-
vious meaning of the requirement."108 The Court declared that the object of 
Congress was not merely to afford transportation for Negroes, which anyone 
selling transportation would of course want to give them if they had the 
money to buy it. Rather: 
It was the discrimination in the use of the cars on account of 
color, where slavery obtained, which was the subject of discussion 
at the time, and not the fact that the colored race could not ride in 
the cars at all. Congress, in the belief that this discrimination was 
unjust, acted. It told the company, in substance, that it could ex-
tend its road into the District as desired, but that this discrimination 
must cease, and the colored and white race, in the use of the cars, 
be placed on an equality. This condition it had the right to impose, 
and in the temper of Congress at the time, it is manifest the grant 
could not have been made without it.100 
Oearly "in the temper of the Congress at the time," segregation in 
transportation was "discrimination," not "equality." We believe that the 
equal protection clause, in the eyes of its contemporaries, froze into constitu-
tional law the existing common law obligation of transportation companies to 
take all comers and to eliminate any possibility of their segregation. Congress 
decided so often in this period that color classifications were not permissible 
107. SEN. REP. No. 131, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1868). 
108. Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445, 452 (U.S. 1873). See also brief for plaintiff 
in this case, United States Supreme Court Library. · 
109. ld. at 452, 453. (Emphasis added). 
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for purposes of transportation that it is difficult to understand how equal pro-
tection could possibly be given another meaning. In 1872, under the leader-
ship of Carpenter, the Senate passed a bill forbidding the making of any 
distinctions because of color by railroads, inns, and theaters ; the conservative 
opposition confined its attack-unsuccessfully-to the inns and theaters sec-
tions, apparently conceding the point as to transportation.l1° By the Civil 
Rights Act of 1875, Congress made a final attempt to obliterate completely 
segregation in transportation.111 
3. Segregation in hotels and theaters. The hotel and theater problem 
was considered much the same as the transportation problem. As to all of 
these facilities, the radicals believed that there was a common law right to ad-
mittance which had obtained constitutional status. There was this differenc~ 
in some minds: the common law right of transportation was wholly "civil" 
while the right to a hotel was partially "social." It was felt that the inn-keeper 
must accept a Negro applicant, give him a room and access to the dining 
room, and in no way treat him as an inferior guest. On the other hand, the 
white person renting a room or taking a table had his own right to decide whom 
he would have as his guest in what had become, for the moment, his own 
room and his own table; and the radicals conceded that such a guest could 
exercise dominion as he chose in the selection of his· own guests and com-
panions.112 
There was an even more substantial difference as to theaters. Though 
highly regulated, theaters were not subject to a common law right of general 
use, as were trains or hotels. We find no thinking directed squarely at the 
consequences of this fact, but the inclusion of theaters in the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875 seems to have been based on a theory that since theaters were ex-
tensively regulated, they were creatures of the law and therefore subject to 
the requirements of equality.l13 
4. Segregation in education. To understand the relation of equal pro-
tection to education, it is necessary to recall two crusades, abolitionism and the 
public school movement, both of which began major aggressive development 
in the 1830's. The rapid spread of abolitionism from a few print shops and 
110. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3729 et seq. (1872) (S.l141 and S.99). After 
a proposed amendment by Thurman was defeated, the measure passed the Senate but was 
unsatisfactory to the extreme radicals because it did not go far enough. Id. at 3735-37. 
Its provisions were eventually included in the broader Sumner Civil Rights bill. 
111. This Act forbade interference with "the full and equal enjoyment" of any "pub-
lic conveyances on land or water." 18 STAT. 335 (1875). 
112. See note 93 supra. 
113. Sumner's legal theory was expressed thus: "Show me, therefore, a legal in-
stitution, anything created or regulated by law, and I show you what must be opened 
equally to all without distinction of color." CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Zd Sess. 242 
(1871). Inclusion of theaters may reflect a Puritan attitude that theaters exist wholly by 
legal suffrance. Cf. 1 BEARD. RisE OF AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 465, 466 (1935). 
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meeting places occurred because the whole society was ripe for a wave of good 
works, such as land reforms, suffrage, temperance agitation, women's rights, 
and many other ameliorative movements. As abolition was a crusade, so was 
the movement for public schools, which were spread throughout the North in 
the y~ears between 1830 and the Civil War. Frequently the abolitionists and 
the public school men were the same people. There was no limit to the social 
go_od which was e.."<pected of the schools by their sponsors. Said Thaddeus 
Stevens, as Pennsylvania leader of the free school movement: "What earthly 
glory is there equal in luster and duration to that conferred by education ?"114 
The public; school system made much less headway in the South. The 
children of the well-to-do went to private academies, while others usually had 
little or no schooling at all. By the census of 1850, illiteracy among native 
whites was twenty percent in the South, three percent in the Midwest, and less 
~an one percent in New England.115 
In New England particularly, education was the vehicle for the indoc~ 
trination of Puritan morality, and nowhere was its use as an auxiliary to 
other crusades more fully appreciated. Hence in the wake of the Northern 
troops came the school teachers of the Freedmen's Aid societies, ready to 
make abolition a success by educating the South.116 A substantial part of 
post-war education in 1865 and 1866 was in the hands of these societies; the 
task of teachers included a mingling of education and propaganda for children 
and adults.117 
To these societies with a blind confidence in the capacity of education to 
solve all of the nation's social ills, nothing was impossible; and this is an im~ 
portant element in the social psychology from which the Fourteenth Amend~ 
ment emerged. In tlus philosophy, of ~ourse, schools should be mixed rather 
than segregated. The Constitution of the American Freedmen's and Union 
Commission, a central agency for these educational societies, specifically pro~ 
vided that "No schools or supply depots shall be maintained from the benefits 
of which any person shall be excluded because of color."11B 
Like the objects of many of the rest of the pre-Civil War crusades, com~ 
114. WooDBURN, THE LIFE oF THADDEUS STEVENS, 49 (1913). 
115. EATON, FREEDOM oF THoUGHT IN THE OLD SoUTH c. 3 (1940). 
116. "We must plant a 'Yankee school' in every Southern county, if we expect the 
rising generation of the recent slave States to march arm in arm with Massachusetts in 
the future." FREEDMEN's REcoRD 159 (1866). The most vivid record of the work of 
Northern educational agencies is in their publications, particularly the AMERICAN 
FREEDMAN and the FREEDMEN's JoURNAL. Their work was very substantial, the Com-
mission operating 307 schools with 774 teachers and 40,744 students, requiring $769,000 
in cash and supplies· in 1866. AMERICAN FREEDMAN 9 ( 1866). 
117. Typical is a report from one teacher: "Every member of my school subscribed 
without any hesitation to the third clause, relating to profanity; and all but three have now 
taken the first pledge, relating to intoxicating .drinks. But the tobacco clause is the lion 
hardest to overcome." AMERICAN FREEDMAN 26 (1866). 
118. I d. at 18. 
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mingled education was easier to dream than to achieve.119 At the close of the 
War in states both North and South, Negroes were excluded from education 
altogether. The first task was to achieve awy kind of Negro education, and 
in the South efforts to do even this were sometimes met by violence or 
ostracism.120 
As will be shown, there is room for substantial difference of opinion con-
cerning the dominant intent of the reconstruction decade as to mixed schools; 
but it does seem clear that if the schools were to be separate, genuine equality 
was required. Governor Morton of Indiana, at the same time that he recom-
mended ratification by his state of the Amendment, recommended that the 
state terminate its policy of barring Negroes from public education and that 
tax funds proportionate with their number be allocated for their benefit.121 
On the specific ground that the South was not offering opportunities for Ne-
gro education, Representative Donnelly sponsored an amendment to the Freed-
men's Bureau Bill to permit the Bureau to aid education: "we must make all 
the citizens of the country equal before the law . . . [and] we must offer 
equal opportunities to all men}'122 Senator Howe, in one of the leading 
Senate addresses in support of Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
explained in detail that the equal protection clause would illegalize a Florida 
system whereby Negroes paid taxes for edueational purposes without getting 
full benefits in return.12S 
The confused picture in respect to mixed schools from 1865 to 1875 is a 
product of several factors. In the first place, there was genuine difference of 
opinion in the North on the merits. To the abolitionists, to New England, 
and to the Freedmen's Aid Societies, it was clear that equality banned com-
pulsory segregation. Yet to Governor Morton, also a good Republican, the 
schools in his state should remain separate "in the present state of public 
opinion."124 In the second place, so long as the South made going to school 
optional, collisions were avoided by voluntary choices. Although the Freed-
119. At the same time, the whole psychology of the period must be seen in terms of 
the starry-eyed hopefulness with which the abolitionists approached the educational task. 
They objected to the name of "The Freedmen's Spelling Book" because it implied that 
freedmen were a class apart. Id. at 32. A Miss Mary Hosmer who ran a mixed school 
of 60 students at Summerville, S.C., became a heroine of the organization and her story 
was told under the triumphant heading, "It can be done." Id. at 76. Extended instruc-
tions were prepared on just how the teachers should handle mixed schools, id. at 38, and 
the New England Freedmen's Aid Society listed as one of its primary objectives, "To 
encourage white children to come into our schools, if they show any willingness to do 
so." Id. at 173. The fact is that few whites attended mixed schools during reconstruc-
tion. Boyd, Some Phases of Edncatio11al History it~ the Smtth si11ce 1865 in STUDIES IN 
SOUTHERN HISTORY 259 (1914). 
120. McPHERsoN's SCRAPBOOK, CIVIL RIGHTs BILL OF 1866, at 10. 
121. 9 BREV. LEG. REP. 20, 26 (Ind. 1867). 
122. CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 589 (1866). 
123. Id. at 219 (App.). 
124. See note 121 supra. 
HeinOnline  -- 50 Colum. L. Rev.  156 1950
156 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
men's Aid Society threw their schools open to anyone who chose to come, it 
was only occasionally that white students attended. In the third place, the 
issue was a difficult one and its resolution could usually be postponed without 
Ute necessity of decision. 
One measure of the contemporary radical attitude of the requirement of 
equality can be seen in the acts of the reconstruction governments in the 
·South. In each reconstruction convention, mixed schools were debated, and 
in South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana they were authorized. 
The Soutli Carolina Constitution, for example, provided that all public schools 
"shall be free and open to all ... without regard to race or color."12~ In 
the debate on this clause, opposition was expressed on the ground that the 
whites would not attend under such circumstances; the answer was made that 
this was a necessary part of securing to every one his full political and civil 
equality.126 
The attitude of Congress toward mixed schools in the reconstructed 
states prior to the consideration of the Civil Rights Bill of 18?'5 was incon-
clusive. When Arkansas was to be re-admitted, Senator Henderson offered 
an amendment to the enabling bill which would have permitted the state to 
establish separate schools, but it lost, 5 to 30.127 Language which seems to 
have been incompatible with separate schools passed the Senate but was fi-
nally lost.128 On the other hand, in the bill to re-admit sL't other states in 
1868, the school problem was carefully left alone after obvious deliberation.12D 
The dominant view seems to have been Trumbull's: the proper protection of 
freedmen was assured by giving them the ballot, which was required in each 
instance.130 
The District of Columbia was one place where segregation in schools was 
primarily the problem of Congress. As rapidly as the slaves were freed, 
schools were established for them in the District, and by 1864 the statutes 
provided for a proportional distribution of funds.131 Thus before the equal-
ity movement began its postwar activity, separate schools in the District were 
125. S.C. CaNST. Art. X, § 10 (1868). 
126. 2 FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 64, at 187-189. Southerners seem to have held 
the view that "equality'' required unsegregated education. In 1873 a group of Louisiana 
conservatives, headed by General P. T. Beauregard and determined to try to end recon-
struction by making full compliance with the demands of the War Amendments, recom-
mended "that hereafter no distinction shall exist among citizens of Louisiana in any of 
our public schools or State institutions of education." The movement foundered largely 
because of adverse reaction among up-state Democrats. Williams, The Louisiaua Ut~ifi­
cationMovement of 1873, 11 J. SouTHERN HisT. 349 (1945). 
127. GoNG, GLOBE, 40th Gong., 2nd Sess. 2748 (1868). 
128. Id. at 2901, 2904. 
129. Id. at 2858. 
130. I d. at 2602. "They have got it now, and they will not give it up. They will pro-
tect themselves.'' 
131: 13 STAT. 191 (1864). 
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already a going institution which the radicals were never quite al;>le to upset. 
In the movement to remove racial discrimination in the District, leader-
ship fell to Sumner, and he had to place the various remedies in their proper 
order. A year after the Fourteenth Amendment passed Congress, a Negro 
still could not hold office or be a juror in the District; and Sumner chose 
first to eliminate these restrictions.132 With two pocket vetoes delaying this 
statute,, it was not unti11870 that Sumner reached the District school question 
on his agenda. He introduced a bill "to secure equal rights in the public 
schools in Washington" which was reported out of the District Committee 
but was not considered.133 
Later in that Congress Sumner secured an amendment in Committee to 
a District school bill, providing that "no distinction on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude shall be made in the admission of pupils in 
any of the schools under the control of the Board of Education."134 The 
amendment precipitated general Senate discussion. Though he professed 
complete agreement with its principle, Patterson, the author of the bill, asked 
that the amendment be deleted on the ground that it was impolitic. Harris of 
Louisiana supported Sumner on constitutional grounds, saying "We have 
adopted the principle of equality in the Constitution of the United States, and 
I think this is a proper place to enact a law in accordance therewith." Sumner 
contended that intermingling in schools would work satisfactorily, as it had 
in transportation. In any case, equality required it: "Every child, white or 
black, has a right to be placed under precisely the same influences, with the 
same teachers, in the same school room, without any discrimination founded 
on color." Sawyer argued that the amendment was required in the name of 
equality, and Wilson agreed.135 
Harris and Sawyer were "reconstructed Southerners" and could be ex-
pected to echo Sumner. An independent thought carne when Matt Carpenter 
of Wisconsin, one of the foremost constitutional lawyers in the Senate, added 
his view: 
Mr. President, we have said by our constitution, we have said by 
our statutes, we have said by our party platforms, we have said 
through the political press, we have said from every stump in the 
land, that from this time henceforth forever, where the American 
flag floats, there shall be no distinction of race or color or on ac-
count of previous condition of servitude, but that all men, without 
regard to these distinctions, shall be equal, undistinguished before 
132. Sumner expressed his intention to clean up the District of Columbia problems 
one at a time. CoNG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2nd Sess. 39 (1867). 
133. CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess. 3273 (1870) (S. 361). 
134. CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1053 et seq. (1871) (S. 1244). 
135. The statements referred to in the text are found in the debates, id. at 1054, 
1055,' 1058, 1061. 
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the ,law. Now, Mr. President, that principle covers this whole 
case.lS6 
According to Carpenter, it was absurd to draw the line at the school room 
after Negroes had been given the right to vote, to serve on juries, and to be-
come judges. He insisted that there was no question of social equality, for in 
the management of a public institution distinctions of color could not be made. 
The bill, however, was put aside without action of any sort. 
In 1872 Sumner brought a similar proposal to the floor of the Senate, 
but its opponents again caused the measure to be dropped. Sumner then 
turned to his general civil rights bill, which forbade segregation in schools 
and elsewhere throughout the Union, including the District. The District 
problem was thus merged with the question of segregation in schools gen-
erally. 
Final consideration of mixed schools during Reconstruction came in 
connection with the Civil Rights Act of 1875. More than any other major 
measure of reconstruction, this bill was Sumner's.187 It was a bill to forbid 
segregation throughout the Union, in conveyances, theaters, inns, and schools. 
The core of the Sumner position on segregation, as he e."'Cpressed it in 
the course of debate, was this : 
Then comes the other excuse, which finds Equality in separation. 
Separate hotels, separate conveyances, separate theaters, separate 
schools, separate institutions of learning and science, separate 
churches, and separate cemeteries-these are the artificial substitutes 
for Equality; and this is the contrivance by which a transcendent 
right, involving a transcendent duty, is evaded. . . . Assuming what 
is most absurd to assume, and what is contradicted by all experience, 
that a substitute ean be an equivalent, it is so in form only and not 
in reality. Every such attempt is an indignity to the colored race, 
instinct with the spirit of Slavery, and this decides its character. 
It is Slavery in its last ap'pearance.lss 
Sumner introduced his bill at three sessions in 1870 and 1871. In 1872 
he momentarily attached it to an Amnesty Bill for Confederates with the de-
ciding vote of Vice-President Colfax being cast in its favor; but since the 
amnesty measure required a two-thirds vote by virtue of Section three of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Democrats were able to defeat it in order to 
avoid the civil rights provisions.189 Sumner was away from the Senate for 
136. CoNG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1056 (1871). 
137. This measure, which was the last serious effort of the abolition movement to 
control the country's policy toward Negroes, occupied Sumner's efforts for four years. 
Almost his last words, as he lay dying and semi-conscious in his home in Washington, 
surrounded by white and colored friends, were "Don't let it fail, my bill, the Civil Rights 
Bill." SHOTWEU., LIFE oF CHARLES SuMNER 717 (1910). 
138. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 382, 383 (1872). Emphasis added. 
139. For a summary of these events, see SHOTWELL, op. cit. supra note 137, at 200, 
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the first part of the year 1873. In December of that year, he introduced the 
measure for the last time, and it passed the Senate shortly after his death in 
1874.140 
The debate over the measure which eventually became the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875 resulted in the most thorough analysis of the segregation problem 
during the reconstruction period. Sumner himself rested the claim for the 
legality of such legislation on both the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth Amend-
ments, claiming that the right not to be segregated was both a privilege of a 
citizen and an aspect of equality.141 A contemporary Ohio Supreme Court 
decision which had upheld separate schools. in that state was urged upon the 
Senate as sound, but was specifically repudiated by the floor leader for the 
bi11.142 The case in which Sumner had originally presented his views on 
equality in the schools, Roberts v. Boston, was cited by the opposition with-
out persuasive effect.143 After Sumner's death, Frelinghuysen of New Jersey 
as new floor leader for the bill, declared that separate schools should be tol-
erated only if voluntarily accepted by both races. He rejected the possibility 
that separate schools would ever in fact be equal, saying, "we know that if we 
establish separate schools for colored people, those schools will be inferior to 
those for the whites."144 
After Sumner's death, it was generally accepted that the basis of the bill 
was the equal protection clause. Frelinghuysen declared that the bill sought 
"freedom from all discrimination before the law on account of race, as one of 
the fundamental rights of United States citizenship." At the point when he 
was most precisely dealing with his claimed authority, he said: "We have the 
right, in the language of the Constitution, to give 'to all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States the equal protection of the laws.' "145 
With Sumner's death, Edmunds of Vermont became the ablest of the 
New England school of constitutionalists. He declared that if the segregation 
principle triumphed, communities might decide that "the foreign born shall 
be taught in one house by one teacher and the native born in another." To 
675 et seq. On one occasion, while Sumner was absent, the Democrats did accept such 
a compromise proposal where the school section was deleted. See CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 3729-42, (1872). 
140. 2 CoNG. R.Ec. 4176 (1874). 
141. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 728 (1872). 
142. State e:: rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871), was specifically dis-
avowed by Senator Frelinghuysen. 2 CoNG. REc. 3452 (1874). The Supreme Court, in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544, 545 (1896), upholding the validity of a segregated 
transportation system, relied on the McCann case and Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 
(Mass. 1850), in reaching its result and did not mention a contemporary Iowa case, 
Clark v. Bd. Directors, 24 Iowa 266 (1868), also discussed by Senator Frelinghuysen, 
which points in an opposite direction. 
143. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 3261 (1872). 
144. 2 CONG, R.Ec. 3452 (1874). 
145. Id. at 3451. 
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take such a view, he said, would permit segregation of Catholics from Protes-
tants, of Methodists from Congregationalists. He rejected "the slave doctrine 
that color and race are reasons for distinction among citizens."140 
The foregoing expressions should not mislead the reader into thinking 
that the New England position was the dominant one among those who car-
ried the Civil Rights Bill in the Senate. That New England point of view, in 
essence, was that separate schools necessarily bred intolerance and should 
not be permitted even if both races desired it. However, the work of the 
Freedmen's Commission had in fact resulted in the existence of schools which 
Negroes attended and whites did not; and in cases where the entire popula-
tion was willing to accept separate schools, the majority was \villing to let 
them do so. It was thus contemplated that separate schools would be for-
bidden by law but that if whole communities chose to waive their rights under 
the statute, there would be no one to complain.147 
The critical judgment of the Senate on the school question came on an 
amendment by Sargent which would have permited separate but equal schools. 
On· May 22, 1874, that amendment failed, 26 to 21, the majority including 
Senators Boutwell, Conkling, and Morrill, all three of whom had been mem-
bers of the committee which drafted the Fourteenth Amendment,14B The ne.....:t 
day the bill itself passed the Senate by a vote of 29 to 16, with 9 of the ma-
jority being members who had participated in the passage of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.149 
The passage of the Civil Rights Bill by the Senate represents a contem-
porary constitutional judgment that segregation in conveyances, theaters, inns, 
. and schools violated either the privileges and immunities clause or the equal 
protection clause. 'While reference was frequently made to both provisions, 
the total impression of the debate is that the violation was thought by most to 
be -of equal protection.150 It is important that the bill as passed was re-
stricted to regulations of institutions which were direct creatures of the law, 
as schools, and those which were thought of as having common law duties to 
146. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 3260 (1872). 
147. "Let the individuals and not the superintendent of schools judge of the com· 
parative merits of the schools." 2 CoNG. REC:. 4151 (1874). (Statement of Senator 
Howe). 
148. ld. at 4167. 
149. ld. at 4176. FLACK, op. cit. s11jJra note 1, at 270-71, lists Allison, Boutwell, 
Conkling, Edmunds, Howe, Morrill of Vermont, Stewart, Washburne, and Windom. 
150. The clauses neither should nor can be completely torn apart. They are, after 
all, parts not only of one plan, but of one· sentence. It was perfectly natural, therefore, 
for Senator Carpenter to believe in "equal protection" of one's "privileges and im-
munities." CoNG. GLOEE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 762 (1872). During the debates on the 
various proposals which finally emerged as the Civil Rights Act of 1875, greater reliance 
naturally was placed on the privileges and immunities clause before it was gutted by the 
decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873). Thereafter occurred a shift 
in debate toward reliance on equal protection. 
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take all comers, as inns and carriers, or were traditionally subject to regula-
tion, as theaters. Sumner's original proposal had included churches and cem-
eteries to which Carpenter had successfully led the opposition on consti-
tutional grounds.161 This abandonment, of course, may have represented a 
judgment as much of politics as of law, but it does represent the continued 
judgment of the decade that equal protection did not extend to purely per-
sonal relationships with no common law base. 
The result in the House was a different story. Almost a year elapsed be-
tween the time of consideration in· the Senate and in the House. In that in-
terim there was sufficient change of sentiment to cause the House to delete 
the school clause, and the measure passed onto the statute books without it. 
The provisions forbidding separate conveyances, inns and theaters and re-
quiring equality in jury service remained.162 
The House had on a previous occasion voted to require mixed schools163 
and the judgment on this occasion to omit that requirement was the product 
of many factors. The principal new element seems to have been the position 
of the George Peabody Fund. Peabody, an American merchant who founded 
what eventually became J. P. Morgan & Co., established a fund of over 
$3,000,000 to aid education in the South. As the Freedmen's Aid Societies 
ran out of money and collapsed, the Peabody Fund be~e the only major 
outside agency aiding Southern edueation. While the Civil Rights Bill was 
pending, the Fund took the position that it would withdraw its aid where 
mixed schools were required. The principal historian of the Fund claims 
that this materially contributed to the change in the bil1.154 Coupled with 
the pressure from the Fund was the repeated assurance from Southern repre-
sentatives that they would end their newly founded public school systems if 
151. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 758-767 (1872). Carpenter's point of view 
as to cemeteries is of particular interest. An argument had been made that any in-
corporated private business was sufficiently the creature of the law to be subject to the 
Fourteenth Amendment. He rejected this view, contrasting schools where he thought 
Congress should prohibit segregation, and private cemeteries which must be left alone. 
ld. at 763 
152. 18 STAT. 335 (1875) (Part 3). 
153. H.R. 1647, CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 2074-75 (1872). 
154. As early as 1870, Dr. Sears, director of the funds, announced that where mixed 
schools were required and white children did not attend, it would help provide separate 
education for white children, 2 FLEMING, op. cit. supra note 64, at 194. In 1874 Sears 
wrote a friend detailing the manner in which he had lobbied against the school provision 
in the Civil Rights Bill, relating interviews with House members, Senators, and finally 
President Grant. In Sears' presence, Grant told Butler, who was eventually in charge of 
the bill in the House, that "it was unwise to attempt to force mixed schools on the South." 
CURRY, BRIEF SKETCH OF GEORGE PEABODY 64, 65 (1898). Sears consistently and ef-
fectively espoused the view that mixed education was a "calamity." ld. at 60-63. The 
abolitionists, in turn, thought very little of him, and one of them declared that Sears had 
imbibed Southern prejudices. ld. at 60. Curry, who was elected Sears' successor upon 
the latter's death in 1881, introduces the topic of mixed schools in the little book from 
which these excerpts are taken with the words, "Some persons, not 'to the manner born', 
took the lead in organizing a crusade for the co-education of the races." Ibid. 
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the Senate measure passed.165 Perhaps for these reasons, as well as others, a 
leading Negro representative from South Carolina consented to eliminating 
the school clause in return for assurances that the rest of the bill would pass.1" 0 
We conclude that it was accepted virtually unanimously by all who sup-
ported the Fourteenth Amendment that it required equal schools and that a 
very large number of its supporters thought that the Amendment forbade 
segregated schools. 
5. Miscegenation. We find it impossible to reach an assured conclusion 
as to the original understanding concerning segregation in matrimony, or the 
prohibition of miscegenation. Senator Reverdy Johnson made a typical at-
tack on the Civil Rights Bill by suggesting that equality of the right to con-
tract extended to the marriage contract and thus permitted miscegenation ;1"7 
but certainly the moderately radical Senators Trumbull and Fessenden thought 
otherwise.158 The abolitionists affirmatively and enthusiastically advocated 
miscegenation on other occasions, but not in 1866 ; and such an extreme 
radical as Wilson of Massachusetts, who twenty-two years before had led the 
fight on the Massachusetts anti-miscegenation law, confined his remarks, per-
haps discreetly, to the broadest possible generalities.lGD 
Charges that the Amendment permitted miscegenation were typically 
countered by the Republicans with a joke to the effect that possible elimina-
tion of anti-miscegenation statutes was not disturbing to them because Re-
publicans had no intention of marrying N egroes.100 Aside from the cam-
paign oratory, it appears probable that miscegenation was so remote a possi-
bility to the majority of persons who supported the Amendment that they 
never seriously thought out the relationship of the two.101 
IV. "STATE AcTION," LYNCHING, AND CoNGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT 
The interpretation commonly given the Fourteenth Amendment since .re-
construction has been that it applies only to affirmative state action, having no 
bearing upon discriminatory acts by private persons.102 A general judgment 
of this sort was so totally foreign to the conceptions of those who passed the 
155. See, e.g., 3 GoNG. REc. 981 (1875) (Statement by Representative Roberts). 
156. Id. at 981 (remarks of Representative Cain). 
157. GoNG. GLOBE, 39th Gong., 1st Sess. 505 (1866). 
158. See note 52 S1tPra. 
159. See GoNG. GLOBE, 39th Gong., 1st Sess. 343 (1866). 
160. For example, during the campaign of 1866 a Democratic meeting featured a bevy 
of white beauties dressed in virginal white and carrying a placard "white husbands or 
none." The ladies became the objects of considerable humor concerning their prospects. 
McPHERsoN's SCRAPBOOK, ELECTION OF 1866, at 4. 
161. Mr. Munro disagrees with this conclusion. 
162. Wru.ouGHBY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 150 (2d stud. ed. 1938) (this accurately 
summarizes the case). 
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Amendment that no real assessment of it can be made in terms of reconstruc-
tion attitudes. 
The over-all judgment of reconstructionists is best illustrated by their 
views on three different matters. In their minds, in addition to affirmative 
discriminatory acts by the states which were clearly prohibited by the Amend-
ment, as for example restrictions against Negroes in jury service, there were 
these different possibilities of discrimination: (a) Discriminations by public 
businesses subject to a common law duty to deal with all customers. Such a 
discrimination denied equal protection because the obligation itself had its 
roots in law. (b) Discriminations by private persons as to matters in which 
the law did not othenvise impose a legal duty, as by exclusion from a home, 
a hotel table, or a church. Such discriminations were wholly outside the 
reach of the Amendment. (c) Finally there was discrimination in the failure 
to enforce the law, as a result of which Negroes might be at the mercy of 
persons who chose to do violence to their persons or property. 
It is clear beyond reasonable doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment was 
meant to enable Congress to legislate affirmatively in behalf of a racial group 
which a state might, because it was a racial group, choose not to protect from 
action of private persons. The major discussion of Congressional power un-
der all of the new Amendments came in 1870 and 1871 with the enactment of 
the First and Second Enforcement Acts, and the Third Enforcement Act, 
usually known as the Ku Klux Act.163 
The First and Second Enforcement Acts, though they included some 
legislation in support of the Fourteenth Amendment, such as the reenactment 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, were predominantly aimed at protection of 
the right to vote in enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment. However, the 
language of the Fifteenth Amendment, "the right . . . to vote shall not be de-
nied by ... any State," raises the same "State action" problems as does the 
language of the Fourteenth, "no State . . . shall deny to any person . . . 
the equal protection of the laws." What is important is that Congress con-
strued the Fifteenth Amendment, after extended discussion, as warranting 
legislation against individual interference with the right to vote and included 
provisions to that effect. It was fully recognized that if "denial" in the 
Fifteenth Amendment extended to acts of omission to enforce by the States, 
it had the same effect in the Fourteenth Amendment.164 The First Enforce-
ment Act, passed within two years after the Fourteenth Amendment was rati-
fied and in the same year that the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, was 
163. 16 STAT.140 (1870); 16 STAT. 433 (1871); 17 STAT.13 (1871). 
164. A summary of the joint discussion of the "denial" problem in the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments is set forth in FLACK, op. cit. supra note 1, at 218 et seq. 
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carried in the Senate by 48 to 11 and in the House by 133 to 58. It would 
be hard to imagine a clearer contemporary construction. 
Extended contemporary debate on whether individual violence could vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment came in March 18'(1 when President Grant 
asked for control of the Klan.165 The resultant legislation, sponsored by 
Representative Shellabarger of Ohio, contained many provisions and a variety 
of civil and criminal penalties against individual acts. The extremest pas-
sage was Section three, providing that "where insurrection, domestic vio-
lence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies" should hinder the e..xecution of 
the state's laws, and the state should for any reason fail to enforce the laws, 
"such facts will be deemed a denial by such State of the equal protection of 
the laws." The President was authorized to use military force to correct the 
situation. 
The Ku Klux bill passed with large majorities after discussion which 
thoroughly explored the question of power. Perhaps the ablest argument 
against the claimed power was made by Trumbull, who had left the radicals 
over the Johnson impeachment issue and who in his address on this issue 
accurately foretold the position the Supreme Court was to take on most of 
the issues of interpretation of the War Amendments.166 
The ·prevailing view, however, was that a state denied equal protection 
when it permitted repeated outrages against one class in the community. It 
was concisely put by Representative Hoar: "It is an effectual denial · by a 
State of the equal protection of the laws when any class of officers charged 
under the laws with their administration permanently and as a rule refuse to 
extend that protection."167 Or, as it was said by Senator Frelinghuysen: "A 
State denies equal protection whenever it fails to give it. Denying includes 
inaction as well as action."168 
Bingham, vigorously' claiming that he was the author of the relevant pas-
sages of Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, made an extended ad-
dress explaining every aspect of his handiwork.169 The most concrete measure 
165. SEN. REP. No. 112, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1866); 14 STAT. 176, 177 (1866). 
166. CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong. 1st Sess. 575 et seq. (1871). This debate is an extraor-
dinarily lucid constitutional discussion. Illustrative of the range of opinion on the en· 
forcement power are the remarks of Representative McHenry, denying its existence, id. 
at 429; Representative Poland, thinking it might be used only in extreme cases, id. at 514: 
and Representative Garfield, expressing doubts, id. at 149 (App.), but voting for the bill. 
The Garfield address is of substantial importance as a direct attack from a responsible Re-
publican in 1866 on an important part of Bingham's theory of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
167. I d. at 334. See also address of Senator Pratt. I d. at 502, 503, 506. 
168. I d. at 501. 
169. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong. 1st Sess. 81 et seq. (App. 1871). On the basis of a 
consideration of substantially all of Bingham's Congressional utterances between 1860 and 
the termination of his service in Congress in 1873, we conclude that he was an able Con-
gressman with a strong egocentricity and a touch of the windbag. As a legal thinker he 
HeinOnline  -- 50 Colum. L. Rev.  165 1950
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 165 
of his position on the subject is that he himself introduced a substitute for the 
Ku Klux bill before the House of which substantially all went into the final 
legislation. He completely endorsed the theory that by the fifth section of the 
Amendment Congress could reach acts of omission as well as those of com-
mission. 
The central point is too simple to warrant much exposition. By their 
words and votes, a decided majority of the members of Congress in 1871 re-
corded their opinion that a state denied equal \protection of the laws when it 
tolerated widespread abuses against a class of citizens because of their color 
without seriously attempting to protect them by enforcing the law. The best 
answer to the question whether the contemporaries of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment thought it permitted legislation against lynching is that they passed just 
such legislation. 
Contemporaries of the Fourteenth Amendment assumed that affirmative 
legislation by Congress would have a place in the enforcement of the Amend-
ment, an assumption which judicial decisions have subsequently denied. It 
was contemplated that there would, of course, on occasion be appeals to the 
Supreme Court from state judicial proceedings in which equal protection was 
denied,l7° but the real reach of the section was anticipated to be through 
measures such as the various civil rights acts passed or contemplated. 
Enough has been said concerning the contemplated function of federal 
legislation in respect to discriminations in the affirmative operation of the 
law. The question remains how extensive the federal enforcement power 
was thought to be when a state failed in specific instances to enforce its laws. 
No clear cut answer to that question emerges from the reconstruction 
decade because that question was never before the country. The country did 
not conceive of itself as confronted with petty municipal and local problems, 
but rather with large scale violence against a racial group in which state gov-
ernments appeared to acquiesce. 
Answers were offered, however, by two members of the radical group of 
outstanding legal ability and integrity, Senator Edmunds and Representative 
George F. Hoar. Speaking about the limitation of the power of Congress to 
maintain a republican form of government, Hoar used words which he doubt-
was not in the same class with the top notch minds of his time, such as Reverdy Johnson, 
Lyman Trumbull, Matt Carpenter or George Edmunds in the Senate, or George Hoar in 
the House. 
170. See, e.g., the remarks of Lieutenant-Governor Greene of Rhode Island in the 
State Senate on January 30 and 31, 1867, arguing that the Amendment would slightly, 
but only slightly, increase the federal appellate jurisdiction. Pamphlet, Providence Daily 
Journal Press (Lib. Cong.). · 
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less considered equally applicable to the power of Congress under the Four-
teeth Amendment: · 
Criminals escape punishment in Massachusetts and Vermont. A 
railroad company does not stand a fair chance for an impartial ver-
dict before a Wisconsin jury. Is Congress to interfere? ... We 
cannot interfere to deal with the incidental evils which attend upon 
republican government; but we should interfere where, we being the 
judges whether the case exists or not, on our oaths responsible to 
the great tribunal of the/American people, wherever these evils 
_have attained such a degree as amounts to the destruction, to the 
overthrow, to the denial to large classes of the people of the blessings 
of republican government altogether.171 
Edmunds approached the problem more directly by pointing out that legis-
lation must be aimed not merely at discriminatory law enforcement, but at 
discriminations for a reason forbidden by the clause. Congress, he ex-
plained, could not penalize interferences with the equal administration of 
justice if it were merely the result of, for example, a private feud, but only if 
it were because a man was "a Democrat, if you please, or because he was a 
Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter."172 
The answer which Hoar's and Edmund's contemporaries probably would 
have given to the question emerges from their observations. Congress could 
legislate to correct state failures to enforce their own laws where the failure 
was of considerable magnitude and where the reason for the failure was 
racial, religious, or perhaps political bias. 
V. SuMMARY AND CoNcLUSIONs 
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were the new 
constitution which emerged from the second American Revolution. Drafted 
and carried to ratification by a group of stem and wilful men, they were in-
tended to make complete changes in the American political system and to fa-
cilitate an economic revolution. One may easily challenge the wisdom of this 
second American Constitution by asserting that it permitted the federal gov-
ernment to reach unprecedentedly far into the internal affairs of the states, 
giving enormous discretion to Congress;. but the challenge to wisdom is no 
·challenge to the fact that this was exactly what was intended. The second 
American Constitution gave no greater power to the federal government than, 
for example, the Commerce Clause gave in the first American Constitution. 
The differentiating factors in the fates of these two American constitu-
tions were these: the economic and political elements that made up a major 
part of the original force behind the War Amendments eventually found that 
171. CoNG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess. 333,334 (1871). 
172. I d. at 566, 567. 
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the policies they once espoused were no longer useful to them,l73 while the 
original Constitution had the consistent support of the wealthy class. More-
over, the original Constitution was interpreted by a Court determined to 
maximize its underlying purposes, while the War Amendments came to a 
Court inclined to construe them narrowly.174 But vastly the most important 
difference was that the War Amendments, unlike the original Consti~ution, 
were thrust by force upon a community whose deepest mores they outraged. 
The net result was that the industrialist element in the original movement for 
the Fourteenth Amendment eventually found in it considerably more to their 
liking than they had ever anticipated, but the element in the· movement which 
had desired to use all three of the War Amendments to create an America in 
which all citizens were truly equal was seriously disappointed. 
Before summarizing the understanding of the reconstruction decade of 
the equal protection clause, we note again that the extreme volatility of this 
revolutionary era means that understandings may have altered between pas-
sage of the Amendment in 1866, its ratification in 1868, and the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875. Our interpretations are those of the reconstruction decade, 
wherever that evidence may be, and not the interpretation of any particular 
year. 
The equal protection clause was, with the foregoing qualification, origi-
nally understood to mean the following : all men, without regard to race or 
color, should have the same rights to acquire real and personal property and to 
173. Hesseltine, Economic Factors i1~ Abandomne1Jt of Reconstructio1~, 22 Miss. VAL. 
HIST.FtEv.191 (1935). 
174. An admirer of the work of the Court says happily in respect of the reconstruc-
tion cases: "They marked the practical overthrow of the Congressional ideal for the Four-
teenth Al}lendment within seven years after its victorious adoption. The Supreme Court 
thus at the outset practically annulled Section Five of the Amendment, and reduced the 
bill of rights section one to distant potentialities." Cou..INS, THE 14TH AMENDMENT AND 
THE STATES, 22, 23 (1912). See also Collins, Constitutional Aspects of the Truman Civil 
Rights Program, 44 ILL. L. FtEv. 1 (1949). Lower court opinions moved in the same 
direction. Charge to Grand Jury, No. 18,260 (C.C.W.D. Tenn. 1875); Charge to Grand 
Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,258 (C.C.W.D.N.C. 1875) ; Texas v. Gaines, 23 Fed. Cas. No. 
13,847 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1874) (opinion by Bradley foreshadowing Civil Rights Cases); 
Greene v. City of Bridgeton, 10 Fed. Cas. No. 5,754 (D.C. Ga. 1879); United States v. 
Dodge, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,976 (W.D. Tex. 1877); Bertonneau v. Bd. Directors, 3 Fed. 
Cas. No. 1,361 (C.C. La. 1878). The last three cases are forerunners of the Supreme 
Court's approval of "separate but equal." Contra: United States v. Newcomer, 27 Fed. 
Cas. No. 15,868 (E.D. Pa. 1876) (upholding validity of Civil Rights Acts of 1875 as ap-
plied to hotels). For leading state cases on segregated schools during this period, see 
State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871), followed in, Nevada e.?: rel. Stoutmeyer v. 
Duffy, 7 Nev. 342 (1872); Clark v. Bd. of Directors, 24 Iowa 266 (1868) (contra but 
distinguishable). 
The one fairly consistent judicial adherent to the original plan of the War Amend-
ments was Mr. Justice Harlan, whose position is reviewed in CLARK, T:a:E CoNSTITU-
TIONAL DoCTRINES OF JusTICE HARLAN (1915), and more recently in Watt and Orlikoff, 
The Coming Vindication of Mr. Justice Harlan, 44 ILL. L. FtEv. 13 (1949). Oddly enough, 
Harlan almost failed of confirmation to his Supreme Court seat because of fears in some 
quarters that he would not be sufficiently radical. Frank, The Appointment of SuPre1ne 
Court Justices, [1'941] Wis. L. FtEv. 172, 207-10. 
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enter into business enterprises ;176 criminal and civil law, in procedures or 
penalties, should make no distinctions whatsoever because of race or color ;170 
there should be no segregation of individuals on the basis of race or color as 
to the right to own or use land ;177 there should be no segreg~tion of indi-
viduals on the ba:sis of race or color in the use of utilities, such as transporta-
tion or hotels ;178 with reservations, for here there is substantial divergence, 
there ~hould be no segregation in the schools.179 It was generally understood 
that Congress could legislate to secure these ends, without regard to whether 
the particular objective was frustrated by state action or by state inaction.180 
On the other hand, the clause was meant to have no bearing on the right to 
vote ;181 the evidence of its contemplated effect on state anti-miscegenation 
laws is unclear ;182 and it was generally understood to have no bearing on seg-
regation of a purely private sort in situations fairly independent of the law, 
as in churches, cemeteries, or private clubs. 
What has been said goes to the measure of equal protection as a rule of 
law. But equal protection deserves measure as more than a rule of law, for 
it represents a part of a symbol, the symbol of equality. The enormous 
175. Decisions in accord with the text range from one of the earliest, Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (invalidating a discrimination against Chinese laundry-
men), fo two very recent, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (invalidating a Cali-
fornia statute setting up racial qualifications for land ownership, some of the. Court resting 
the decision on equal protection grounds), and Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 
410 (1948) (invalidating racial restraints on fishing). 
176. Accord as to juries, Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303; E~ parte Virginia, 
100 U.S. 339 (1880). It is common knowledge that there is in fact extreme discrimina-
tion against Negroes, but by .no means e."<clusively in the South, in every aspect of the 
criminal law from arrest to sentence. 1 MYRDAL, op. cit. supra note 85, at Pt. 6. 
177. Accord, Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). Cf. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 
U.S. 323 (1926); The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 334 U.S. 1, 34 (1948). On the prac-
tical fashion in which geographical segregation is in fact secured, see Frank, The United 
States Supreme Court 1947-48, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 21-26 (1948) : "In sum, prior to the 
restrictive covenant cases, Negroes in Indianapolis could not move out of the areas iden-
tified. That situation is in no wise changed by the restrictive covenant cases.'' 
178. Cot~tra: The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating so much of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1875 as forbade denial of equal rights in transportation and hotels) ; 
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding valid a state segregation statute as 
applied to transportation). 
179. There is no United States Supreme Court opinion which deals in a reasoned way 
with the question of segregation in education. Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) 1 
assumes that such segregation is valid, without actually considering it. For a review of 
the segregated school' cases, see Note, 56 YALE L.J. 1059 (1947). 
180. Co1~tra: United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 555 (1875) (in substance 
construing the Enforcement Act of 1870 and equal protection so as to eliminate "private 
violence" from Congressional control) ; United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) 
(invalidating so much of the Third Enforcement Act as applied to acts of private indi-
viduals). 
181. Contra: Nixon Y. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (invalidating a state election 
law discr!_minating against Negroes as a violation of equal protection). The same result 
is reached in accordance with the original understanding of the Fifteenth Amendment, 
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). 
18Z. Cf. Perez v. Lippold, 198 P. Zd 17 (1948), in which a California anti-miscegena-
tion statute was held invalid, three Justices resting the decision on equal protection 
grounds. 
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potentiality which made that symbol the banner of the abolitionists manifested 
itself not only in the Equal Protection clause but also in the remainder of the 
war amendments. The strongest advocates of '~equality before the law" in 
Congress during the Reconstruction decade hoped to place the recent slaves, 
not half way on the scale between slavery and freedom, but at a level sub-
stantially equivalent and undistinguished from that of the white population. 
That ultimate goal was to be achieved through equal freedom, equal privileges 
and immunities, equal due process, equal rights to vote, and equal protection 
of the laws. As Speaker of the House Schuyler Colfax said in a speech at the 
opening of the Thirty-ninth Congress, "I call them free men, not freed-
men."183 Perhaps equality in all its manifestations is as good a measure as 
any of the difference between free men and freedmen. Who would say that 
we have not made of the Negroes of America a class apart, freedmen still? 
183. HoLLISTER, LIFE oF CoLFAX, 270,271 (1887). 
